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The authority of United States administrative law judges (ALJs), 
formerly known as “hearing examiners,”1 comes from the 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 designed to promote public 
confidence in government and reduce the appearance of bias.3  
Before adoption, administrative adjudication was haphazard and had 
a bad reputation for being arbitrary, as the perception was that agency 
“hacks” could be forced to rubberstamp agency determinations.  
Agencies have a natural tendency to promote from within and are 
jealous of their jurisdictional prerogatives, so the centerpiece of 
reform was to safeguard that future adjudicators would be selected 
through merit selection of impartial trial lawyers and that they would 
be provided decisional independence.4  In addition, two other major 
purposes of the APA are: 
(1)  To require agencies to keep the public informed 
of their organization, procedures and rules; and 
                                                 
* Administrative law judge, United States Department of Labor; liaison 
member of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); past 
president of FALJC, past chair, NCALJ, Judicial Division, American Bar 
Association (ABA) and past long time member of the ABA House of Delegates.  
Author, BREAKING UP WITH CUBA (2011).  The remarks do not represent those of 
the Department of Labor or any other organization. 
Thanks to Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law, 
Washington College of Law, American University, for his comments. 
 
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (2006).  Scholars 
date the first use of administrative law judges to the year 1789, when officers were 
appointed to determine the disability of Revolutionary War soldiers and officers 
who adjudicated custom duties.  3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 17.11 at 313 (2d ed., 1978).  
2 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et. seq.).  
3  See Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1950). 
4  The Federal judiciary has institutional independence, due the separation of 
powers.  Under the APA, administrative law judges have “special status” and a 
“qualified right” of decisional independence.  Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
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(2)  To establish uniform standards for the conduct of 
formal rulemaking and adjudication.5 
I.  OVERVIEW 
Today agency adjudication far exceeds the volume of the Federal 
courts, and although many APA hearings are just like Federal bench 
trials,6 and all agencies could be required to standardize, due process 
is not applied uniformly at more than twenty-nine separate fiefdoms.7  
However, it should not be that way.  In Dickinson v. Zurko, the 
Supreme Court determined that the APA must be applied uniformly 
except where Congress has expressly stated otherwise.
8
  
Unfortunately, this rule has been overlooked. 
In recent years, the quantum of administrative adjudication has 
statistically exploded.  In 1946, there were less than 200 hearing 
officers in the government.  By last count, more than 1500 
administrative law judges work for twenty-eight agencies and hold 
hearings involving hundreds of statutes.9  By 1961, President John F. 
                                                 
5 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1947).  Other primary purposes are:  
1.  To provide for public participation in the rulemaking process;  
2.  To define the scope of judicial review. 
6 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Federal Maritime Comm’n v. 
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Rhode Island Dep’t of 
Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that 
Department of Labor ALJs are functionally equivalent to Federal District Court 
judges).  Whereas a trial judge’s principal responsibility is to conduct trials before 
juries that determine the facts of a dispute, we must determine both fact and law 
and reduce our factual rulings to writing.   
7  This article discusses only “formal” adjudications involving trial-like 
hearings with witness testimony, a written record, and a final decision.  Under 
“informal” adjudication, some agency decisions are made using “inspections, 
conferences and negotiations” rather than a “hearing on the record.”  The 
legislative intent of the APA comes in part from the FINAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 
8, 77th Cong. (1
st
 Sess. 1941), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/apa1941.pdf (last visited Mar. 
26, 2013) [hereinafter “FINAL REPORT”]. 
8
 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
9 See Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge 
Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 476 (2011).  Although 
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Kennedy acknowledged that APA cases “permeate every sphere and 
almost every activity of our national life [and] have a profound effect 
upon the direction of our economic growth.”10  Although not all 
adjudication is governed by the APA, the Social Security 
Administration, standing alone, administers the largest system of 
adjudication in the world.11 
                                                 
Professor Lubbers advises that the growth of APA adjudication has increased 
primarily at SSA and is in decline elsewhere, as stated later, I find that the 
published studies have been quite deficient. 
This view does not account for the exploding volume of Medicare appeals now 
heard by a separate agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid. 
This view also does not account for the dozens of new areas of adjudication 
added by the past several Congresses.  For example, at my agency, the Department 
of Labor, cases that may take days or weeks to hear, and more time to write, such 
as under whistleblower Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) claims, now dominate our 
dockets.  Others include whistleblower claims under National Transit Systems 
Security Act of 2007; the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008; 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Section 1012, as amended by the FDA Food Safety 
and Modernization Act (FSMA); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; 
and the Seamen’s Protection Act.  Moreover our “traditional” cases, such as H-1B 
Visa cases, are on the rise. 
10 President John F. Kennedy, H.R. DOC. NO. 135, 57th Cong., at 1–2 (1st 
Sess. 1961), quoted in Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a 
Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B. J. 351, 353 (1967) and in Victor Palmer and 
Elmer S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as an 
Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 673, 674 (1983–
1984). 
11 Information About Social Security’s Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_odar.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).  “[T]he Chief Administrative Law Judge directs a 
nationwide field organization consisting of 10 regional offices, 169 hearing offices 
(including 7 satellite offices), 5 national hearing centers, and 1 national case 
assistance center.”  Id.  In fiscal year 2011, SSA hearings offices issued over 
 
793,000 adjudications, of which approximately 740,000 were 
issued by [administrative law judges] and over 53,000 were 
issued by Attorney Adjudicators.  An Attorney Adjudicator can 
issue an allowance decision that does not require a hearing.  See 
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.942, 416.1442.  Of the 740,000 dispositions 
issued by administrative law judges, approximately 629,000 
dispositions resulted in an allowance or denial decision, and the 
remaining 111,000 dispositions were dismissals of the hearing 
request.  A hearing request can be dismissed for a variety of 
reasons, including failure of the claimant to appear at the hearing, 
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As administrative adjudication began to increase, especially when 
the Franklin Roosevelt administration introduced more regulation, 
legal experts contemplated how to best extend due process rights.12  
The APA idea may first have been suggested in May 1933, by an 
American Bar Association Special Committee on Administrative 
Law.13  To avoid the appearance of bias, the ABA determined that 
the “‘judicial function’ [of each agency] . . . should be transferred to 
an independent tribunal or, alternatively, that officials’ decisions 
should be completely reviewable on the facts as well as on the law by 
a tribunal marked by judicial independence.”14  To administrative law 
judges, as well as many litigants, and those concerned with judicial 
economy, this goal became a quest. 
 
II. THE CORPS CONCEPT 
In 1936, legislation was offered to consolidate Article I courts 
with hearing examiners.15  However, lawyers that appeared before 
certain agencies such as Customs, Tax, and the Patent Office opposed 
                                                 
the claimant choosing to withdraw the hearing request, or death 
of the claimant.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957, 416.1457. 
 
SSA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT A-
07-12-21234: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES’ DECISIONS 1 n.2 (2012).  See also CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE REPORT A-12-11-01138: OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
WORKLOAD TRENDS (2012); JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY 
HEARINGS AND APPEALS 1 (1978) and RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 8.1 (5th ed. 2010). 
12 The Classification Act of 1923 placed hearing examiners as “mere tools of 
the Agency” and thus did not have decisional independence.  See Ramspeck v. Fed. 
Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953). 
13 Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 219 (1986). 
14 Id.  In 1934 the ABA proposed legislation to create “a federal administrative 
court with branches and an appellate division, or, failing that, ‘an appropriate 
number of independent tribunals’ unencumbered by ‘legislative and executive 
functions.’”  Id. 
15 S. 5154, 70th Cong. (2d Sess. 1939).  See Testimony of Abraham Alan 
Dash, Esquire, Professor of Law, University of Maryland, Cong. Rec., S. 1275, 
89th Cong, at 97 (June 23, 1983) [hereinafter “Testimony of Dash”].  See also 
Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 219. 
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the Bill, and the legislation failed.  Subsequently, Congressional 
committees considered the issue and agreed that uniformity should be 
applied but could not reach a consensus on the details.  In 1939, 
President Roosevelt asked the Attorney General to study 
administrative law.  The Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure studied the methods, rules and regulations 
and the general effects on the public.  “Forty agencies and distinct 
entities within departments were studied; twenty-seven descriptive 
and evaluative monographs” were published.16  The research was 
circulated and after public notice and individual invitations to 
100,000 interested individuals, public hearings were held to receive 
oral or written opinions about administrative procedure.17 
In anticipation of the Attorney General’s Committee report, a 
“Walter-Logan Bill” version of the APA was passed, containing the 
ABA recommendations.  However, since it was passed before the 
Committee report was completed, it was vetoed by President 
Roosevelt.18 
Within the Attorney General’s Committee, a majority supported: 
 
(1) Creation of an Office of Federal Administrative 
Procedure, with continuing responsibility and power 
to seek just and efficient discharge of official duties, 
and also to appoint and remove hearing 
commissioners; 
(2) Publication of rules, policies, and interpretations; 
formulation and effective date of rules; requests for 
promulgation or amendment of a rule; 
                                                 
16 See Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 226.  See also S. DOC. NO. 10-77 (1941); S. 
DOC. NO. 186-76, (1940). 
17 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 8-77, at 1 (1941). 
18 See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,942–43 (1940) (President’s veto message), reprinted 
in 27 A.B.A.J. 52 (1941).  “The President attached to his veto message an extended 
analysis of the bill by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, “pointing out some of 
the perhaps unintended consequences of the bill’s excessively generalized 
provisions.”  See Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 226 n.22.  See also 86 Cong. Rec. 
13,943–45 (1940). 
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(3) Utilization of hearing commissioners in formal 
adjudicatory proceedings, a statement of 
commissioners’ powers and duties, and of the effect 
and reviewability of their decisions; 
(4) Empowerment of agencies to issue a judicially 
reviewable declaratory ruling in order to terminate a 
controversy or remove an uncertainty. 
 
The minority members of the Committee also requested: 
(1) The separation of prosecuting and judicial 
functions,  
(2) The scope and practice of judicial review, and  
(3) A “Code of Standards of Fair Procedure.” 
 
According to Gellhorn, a member of the Committee, now known 
as the “father” of the APA, haggling among the Attorneys General, 
including Robert Jackson and eventually Tom Clark, who would later 
become Supreme Court justices, and the Congress, homogenized the 
issues so that it “seemed somewhat anticlimactic” by the time that the 
APA passed on May 24, 1946.19  At passage, there was “no 
indication of dissent.”20  In any event, the APA did not address 
whether hearing officers should be employed by a single agency, 
constitute an Article I court, or remain with their agencies. 
The APA does not require an agency to provide a hearing, but 
when it does so, it must be heard by an administrative law judge or 
the head of the agency.  Section 11 of the APA was intended as a 
Federal Bill of Rights for adjudicators, providing that: 
 
 Examiners shall perform no duties inconsistent 
with their duties and responsibilities as hearing 
examiners; 
 Examiners are removable only for “good cause” 
established by the Civil Service Commission; only 
after an opportunity for an oral hearing and upon 
the record thereof; and 
                                                 
19 Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 232–33. 
20 Id. at 232. 
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 Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed 
by the commission independently of agency 
recommendations or rating21 
 
In 1972, the title “hearing examiner” was changed to 
“Administrative Law Judge.”22  These Section 11 protections were 
later incorporated into descriptions of the administrative law judge 
positions adopted by the Civil Service Commission and later the 
Office of Personnel management.  The Administrative Law Judge 
position is the only merit-selected judicial position in the Federal 
system.23 
                                                 
21 Ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1944) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 
7521(a)). 
22 See Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of 
Progress and the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1425 (1976). 
23 Applicants must be licensed attorneys “authorized to practice law under the 
laws of a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or 
any territorial court,” who have a minimum of seven years of “experience as a 
licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or reviewing formal hearings 
or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal, State, or local 
level.”  Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, U.S. 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
According to a 1992 ACUS study, the APA 
 
contemplated the existence of impartial factfinders, with 
substantive expertise in the subjects relevant to the adjudications 
over which they preside, who would be insulated from the 
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts of employing agencies 
through protections concerning hiring, salary, and tenure, as well 
as separation-of-functions requirements.  The decisions of such 
impartial factfinders were made subject to broad review by 
agency heads to ensure that the accountable appointee at the top 
of each agency has control over the policymaking for which the 
agency has responsibility. 
 
Paul Verkuil, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, ACUS Recommendation 92-7, 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/federal-administrative-judiciary (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013) (adopted on Dec. 10, 1992). 
When I applied for a position in the 1980s, minimum requirements included 
production of evidence for fifteen civil jury trials I had been involved with; twenty 
professional references; seven years litigation experience; a written test; and an 
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After enactment of the APA, the Hoover Commission,24 the 1971 
Ash Commission,25 the LaMacchia Committee Report of the 1974 
Civil Service Commission,26 and the 1977 Bork Commission27 all 
recommended a unified corps.28  In fact, the Bork Committee 
proposed an Article I trial division within the judiciary branch, which 
“could serve the function now served by administrative law 
judges.”29 
                                                 
interview by a panel that included one judge, one member of the bar, and one 
agency person.  Dozens of people, including several judges, reported that my 
background and trial experience was investigated. 
24 Actually, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government was appointed by President Harry S. Truman in 1947 to recommend 
administrative changes in the Federal Government of the United States.  It took its 
nickname from former President Herbert Hoover, who was appointed by Truman to 
chair it.  A second Hoover Commission was created by Congress in 1953, during 
the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Also headed by Hoover—
who was then almost eighty years old—the second commission sent its final report 
to Congress in June 1955. 
25 Named for Roy Ash, former CEO of Litton Industries, appointed in 1968, by 
President Richard M. Nixon, to create and lead the President’s Advisory Council 
on Executive Organization, which later came to be known as the Ash Commission.  
The reports of the Commission also lead to the creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
26 See U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY 
OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1974).  Chaired by the 
Civil Service Commission’s then Deputy Counsel, Phillip LaMacchia, it sought the 
views of administrative law judges and sampled the opinions of federal agency 
officials, private practitioners, and Bar Association representatives about the 
quality and quantity of administrative law judge work products, relationships 
between judges and their agencies, standards of review of administrative law judge 
decisions, and criteria for recruitment of administrative law judges.  See id.  
Although the final report found that an independent corps appears to be 
organizationally feasible and may be an effective approach, it also found that more 
information and detailed planning and analysis was needed.  “The matter warrants 
consideration of a recommendation to institute and fund a professional 
management analysis of the feasibility and public benefit consequence of this 
proposal.”  Id. at 4–5. 
27 COMMISSION ON THE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 42381 NCJ (1977) 
(hereinafter “BORK COMMISSION REPORT”). 
28 Testimony of Dash, supra note 15. 
29 BORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 7–11. 
    
Spring 2013 Fundamental Fairness    61 
 
Critics charged that administrative law judges constituted an 
invisible judiciary that held secret proceedings and that litigants 
before some agencies were trapped in a complex world of 
bureaucracy and red tape.30 
Although the Civil Service Commission initially had procedural 
jurisdiction over administrative law judges, in 1979 the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) succeeded the Commission and was 
mandated to administer an Administrative Law Judge program and to 
maintain a register of qualified applicants and test and evaluate 
prospective applicants.31  “The classification of ‘administrative law 
judge’ is reserved by OPM for the specific class of appointments 
made under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and applies to all agencies.”32 
                                                 
30 Remarks of Representative Austin Murphy, in introducing the Corps Bill, 
March 1, 1989 [hereinafter “Murphy Remarks”].  The notion that administrative 
law judges were invisible was furthered after Jeffrey S. Lubbers used the term in 
his paper, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 
33 ADMIN. L. REV. 123 (1981).  Professor Lubbers advised me in an email, “that 
article certainly was not critical of ALJs nor did it imply that they held secret 
proceedings or that the litigants were ‘trapped’ . . . . My title was simply intended 
to indicate that the administrative judiciary was not well known and that ALJs were 
doing their important jobs in an unseen way.”   
31 The United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is an 
independent agency of the United States government that manages the civil service 
of the federal government.  The commission was abolished and replaced by OPM 
on January 1, 1979 following the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783. 
32 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, infra note 49, at 2 n.2. 
 
The title “administrative law judge” is the official class title for 
an administrative law judge position.  Each agency will use only 
this official class title for personnel, budget, and fiscal purposes.  
5 C.F.R. § 930.203b.  5 C.F.R. § 930.201 requires OPM to 
conduct competitive examinations for administrative law judge 
positions and defines an administrative law judge position as one 
in which any portion of the duties includes those which require 
the appointment of an administrative law judge under 5 U.S.C. § 
3105.  ALJs can only be appointed after certification by OPM: 
“[a]n agency may make an appointment to an administrative law 
judge position only with the prior approval of OPM, except when 
it makes its appointment from a certificate of eligibles furnished 
by OPM.”  5 C.F.R. § 930.203a; see also 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000) 
(providing for pay for administrative law judges, also subject to 
OPM approval). 
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The APA contemplated that the Civil Service 
Commission would oversee merit selection and 
appointment of ALJs and would also act as an 
ombudsman for the ALJ program, but OPM has 
essentially abandoned that role.  Section 1305 
provides that, for the purpose of sections 3105 
(appointment), 3344 (loans), and 5372 (pay), OPM 
may investigate, prescribe regulations, appoint 
advisory committees as necessary, recommend 
legislation, subpoena witnesses and records, and pay 
witness fees.33 
  
By the late 1970s, several suggestions coalesced into a unified 
concept after ABA President Bernard Segal requested creation of a 
Corps of Administrative Law Judges.34  Congress considered 
enactment.  According to sponsors of the legislation, a corps would 
“serve to dismiss one of the oldest problems facing the Federal 
administrative judiciary, the question of judicial impartiality.”35  To 
some of the public, despite the intent of the APA, administrative law 
judges still looked like agency hacks, who would defer, if not submit, 
to agency authority.  Besides an appearance of bias, it was also 
alleged that as agency employees, administrative law judges were 
vulnerable to a variety of subtle—and not so subtle—pressures from 
their employing agency.36  
                                                 
 
Id. at 2. 
33 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, infra note 49, at 4 (quotation marks omitted).  
See also 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012). 
34 Bernard Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and 
the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424 (1976). 
35 Id. at 1424 n.30 (“A direct result of the present structure of the 
administrative hearing system is a public concern that ALJ’s, because they are 
agency employees, are not impartial.  The comments of one pro se litigant 
defending himself against U.S. Department of Labor’s charges of violating the 
Davis-Bacon Act aptly summed up public suspicion of the Federal administrative 
judiciary.  The defendant complained, ‘How can I expect to win this case when the 
Department of Labor is my accuser, prosecutor and judge?’”) 
36 Id. (“An agency’s control over promotional opportunities, office space and 
support staff is a source of very real power and control over administrative law 
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Some of these complaints were substantiated, especially those 
directed at the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA).  Most of 
the allegations of improper agency interference and demands for a 
corps came from administrative law judges at SSA—by far the 
largest employer of administrative law judges—and by 
representatives of claimants.  After the agency refused to bargain 
with them, judges sued to enforce Section 11 of the APA.  In 1979, 
while a case to enforce the APA protections was pending,37 
Congressional hearings revealed that the agency was at war with 
itself.38  The agency and the judges entered a consent order.  SSA 
agreed: 
 
1.  Not to set quotas, and /or goals in numbers of cases to be 
scheduled, heard or decided in given periods of time; 
2.  To assign cases in strict rotation; 
3.  On remand, to re-assign cases only with the consent of the 
judge who was originally assigned the case; and 
4.  To abandon a criticized quality review system that would 
have permitted the agency to rate and evaluate the individual 
performance of administrative law judges. 
 
SSA also decided not to impose a proposed hearing office manager 
position that would have removed control of the staff from the judges 
and have given it to a non-judge management official.39  
                                                 
judges.  Even though most agencies refrain from exerting pressure to influence 
their judge’s decisions, the fact that such pressure may be applied compromises the 
integrity of the entire system.”) 
37 Charles N. Bono et al. v. United States of America, United States District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri, Civil Action No. 77-0819-CV-4 (W.D. 
Mo. 1979). 
38 Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper, 
Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 
96-2 (1979); see also FRANK B. BOROWIEC, UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW: IN THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AN AGENCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(iUniverse.com, 2011).  At one time, Judge Borowiec was Regional Chief Judge, 
Atlanta Region, and was also an officer of AALJ. 
39 Charles N. Bono, The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law Judge 
at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the Social Security Administration, 15 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 235 (1995).  According to Judge Bono, shortly 
after the case was filed, Associate Commissioner Louis B. Hayes issued a 
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In 1981, after the agency had removed hundreds of thousands of 
disability recipients from the rolls without a hearing, a Bellmon 
Review Program, “a series of measures reportedly designed to 
improve decisional quality and accuracy,”40 was accelerated, which 
led to “own motion” review of thousands of cases that had not been 
appealed.41  Judges’ decisions, usually awards of benefits to 
disability claimants, were administratively overturned and remanded 
for new hearings, and individual judges who had a high number of 
                                                 
memorandum to the judges announcing a “Bellmon Review” of judges who had 
allowed more than 66 2/3% of their cases, as it was determined that judges who 
allowed more were aberrational and needed to be studied to determine how to 
counsel them.  Certain judges had been selected and notified to appear for 
“counseling.”  The judges who were about to be “counseled” called upon the 
Association for help, and their cause was included in the litigation.  The court 
issued a protective order, and the judges never had to appear for their behavior 
modification training; but the issue of Bellmon Review remained.  So not only was 
it obvious to the judges that they had a numerical quota to meet, but a new twist 
had been added to caution them that if they allowed too many cases, as compared 
to the national average, they would be identified, and counseled.  It was later in the 
trial of the case learned that in the performance plan of the Associate 
Commissioner Louis B. Hayes, one of his charges was to reduce the allowance rate 
overall in the hearings and appeals system. 
The case was tried for two weeks, taken under advisement by the court, and 
pending the decision the agency announced by memorandum to the judges that it 
was discontinuing Bellmon Review.  The case was dismissed in 1985 by the court, 
on the basis that the issue was moot, that the Association had reformed the agency, 
and that attorneys’ fees were paid by the agency.  See generally id.  
40 Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 
(D.D.C. 1984).  The “Bellmon Review Program” was named after the Bellmon 
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-265 (1980) (discussed at 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982)).  
The Amendment referred to Section 304(g) of Pub. L. No. 96-265, the “Social 
Security Disability Amendments of 1980,” set forth that SSA institute a program of 
ongoing review of administrative law judge decisions.  
41 Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1133. 
 
Initially, individual ALJs with allowance rates of 70% or higher 
were to have 100% of their allowance decisions reviewed for 
accuracy and hearing offices with allowance rates of 74% or 
higher would also be reviewed.  106 ALJs, or approximately 13% 
of all ALJs in SSA, were placed on Bellmon Review because of 
their high allowance rates.  The selection of entire hearing offices 
for review was soon discontinued. 
 
Id. at 1134. 
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awards were targeted as outliers.  Legislation to encourage SSA to re-
visit cases every three years under Continuing Disability Review 
(CDR) increased the dockets, and pressure was applied to obtain 
greater administrative law judge productivity, as lower producing 
judges were also targeted.  
At the same time, under a policy of “non-acquiescence,” SSA 
took the position that only the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States were binding on it.  It made exceptions for those 
decisions that the agency chose to adopt by changing the regulations 
and to those decisions it decided to acquiesce.  This infuriated many 
Circuit Court and other Federal judges, and in several cases the 
agency was held in contempt for missing judicially imposed 
deadlines42 or failing to follow orders of United States Circuit Courts 
of Appeal.43   
Administrative law judges at SSA were convinced that if the 
agency could not retaliate against the courts, it projected totem 
animus on them.  In at least one case involving judges’ allegations of 
agency hostility to judicial independence, a United States District 
Court concluded that the agency’s “unremitting focus on allowance 
rates in the individual ALJ portion of the Bellmon Review Program 
created an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which 
violated the spirit of the APA . .  . .”44  The Senate Subcommittee on 
                                                 
42  In the 1980s, SSA was missing court ordered deadlines as often as 90% of 
the time, and contempt citations from district courts were common.  Koch and 
David Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, n.320 
(1990). 
43 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Chater, 99 F.3d 286, 287–88 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom., 
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328 
(1983).  In others, contempt was threatened.  See, e.g., Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 
F.2d 813, 824 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., concurring); Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 
428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J., concurring specially); Valdez v. 
Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 n.3 (D. Colo. 1983). 
44 Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 
(D.D.C. 1984).  The Court stated further that  
 
if no specific provision thereof, Defendants’ insensitivity to that 
degree of decisional independence the APA affords to 
administrative law judges and the injudicious use of phrases such 
as “targeting,” “goals” and “behavior modification” could have 
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Oversight of Government Management determined that the CDR 
system and Bellmon review were mistakes,45 and the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services did, in effect, admit a mistake was made 
and issued a moratorium of the cessations, putting thousands of 
people back on the disability roles.46  
In 1981, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, then a senior staff attorney for the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), suggested a 
test of the Corps concept.47  Administrative law judges from 
seventeen selected “regulatory” agencies would comprise a separate 
corps for five years.  Anticipated efficiencies would likely “mute any 
opposition . . . since adjudication is not as central to the missions of 
most of these agencies as it is to the others.”48  He also suggested that 
                                                 
tended to corrupt the ability of administrative law judges to 
exercise that independence in the vital cases that they decide.  
However, defendants appear to have shifted their focus, obviating 
the need for any injunctive relief or restructuring of the agency at 
this time.  While it is incumbent upon the agency to reexamine 
the role and function of the Appeals Council and its relationship 
to the ALJs in light of this litigation, it would be unsuitable for 
the Court to order any affirmative relief under the present 
circumstances.  Plaintiff has achieved considerable success in its 
valid attempt to reveal and change agency practices. 
 
Id. 
45 Oversight of Social Security Disability Benefits Terminations: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982). 
46 See Social Security in Review, Public Statements by Secretary Schweiker 
and Commissioner Svahn, 45 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1 (1982); Social Security Disability 
Reviews: the Human Cost, Joint Hearing Before the Special Committee on Aging, 
98th Cong. (1984).  Several states acted independently to end the review at the state 
agency level.  New York State Social Services Commissioner Cesar Perales 
ordered that no disabled New Yorkers be removed from the disability rolls until the 
federal government promulgates “appropriate” medical standards for assessing 
whose benefits should be discontinued.  Several others soon followed.  
47 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at 
the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981). 
48 Id. at 276.  Actually, some agencies rarely use rulemaking but rely almost 
exclusively on adjudication to create precedent.  An agency may establish binding 
policy through rulemaking procedures by which it promulgates substantive rules, or 
through adjudications, which constitute binding precedents.  Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39–41 (1964); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
202–03 (1947).  In those cases, the threshold issue is whether it would have been 
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the entire corps of ALJs could be centralized into separate panels of 
specialization.  Although it was discussed, Congress did not adopt the 
proposal. 
The ABA adopted policy continuing to support the independence 
and integrity of the administrative judiciary in 1983, 1989, 1998, 
2000 and 2001.  ABA policy supports both a Corps and a Conference 
concept, effective in August 2005.49  In August 1986, the President of 
the American Bar Association presented an award to the Social 
Security Administrative Law Judge “corps,” which was received by 
the Association of Administrative Law Judges on their behalf: 
 
For its outstanding efforts during the period from 
1982–1984 to protect the integrity of Administrative 
Adjudication within their agency to preserve the 
public’s confidence in the fairness of governmental 
institutions and to uphold the rule of law.50 
 
The award was given in recognition of the Association’s efforts in 
redressing the wrongs of the CDI program and opposing efforts of 
the agency to set numerical quotas and instituting measures to 
attempt to force certain judges to reduce allowance rates.51  
                                                 
possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agency’s conclusion in a case heard on 
the record.  NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 
(1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
49  The resolution states: 
 
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association encourages 
Congress to establish the Administrative Law Judge Conference 
of the United States as an independent agency to assume the 
responsibility of the United States Office of Personnel 
Management with respect to Administrative Law Judges, 
including their testing, selection, and appointment. 
 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/administrative_
law_judiciary/resolution_106a.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) 
(adopted by the House of Delegates on August 8–9, 2005). 
50 See American Bar Association Award (Aug. 11, 1986), presented at the 
American Bar Association’s annual dinner in Lincoln Center, New York City.   
51 Bono, supra note 39, at 237–38. 
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In 1983, Senate Bill 1275 included language that would have 
provided that one circuit court would hear all administrative 
appeals.52  However, due to practical issues, and to keep the 
proposals as bipartisan as possible, concepts such as a Social Security 
court or a single circuit to hear all administrative cases were 
removed.  An effort was made to ensure that legislation would 
promote efficiency and would save the government enough to make 
it palatable to a majority. 
Although Social Security tried to restrict judicial independence, 
most other agencies had no such problem, and academics noted that 
administrative law judges needed to be insulated from agency 
pressure.53  Courts noted analogies to their own judicial 
independence.  In Butz, the Supreme Court stated: “There can be 
little doubt that the role of the modern federal . . . [ALJ] . . . is 
‘functionally comparable to that of a judge.’”54  Nash v. Califano 
compared SSA administrative law judges to Article III judges.55 
In scoring the 1989 version of the Corps Bill, estimates from the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicated that potential savings 
                                                 
52  See Paul N. Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies—Odyssey of 
an Administrative Law Judge, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 217 (1975).  Pfeiffer was a 
member of the Civil Service Commission study group on the effectiveness of 
administrative law judges.  See id. at 217. 
53 E.G. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence 
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 456–57, 499–500 
(1986).  The authors advocated the same independence for administrative law 
judges as that of Article III judges because: “without prophylactic protection of 
adjudicatory independence, the Constitution’s majestic guarantee of due process of 
law may in reality be no more than a deceptive facade.”  Id. at 505. 
54 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).  Butz involved a futures 
commission merchant who brought an action against the Department of Agriculture 
and others seeking damages on ground that defendants had wrongfully initiated 
administrative proceedings against merchant and his company.  Id. at 480–81.  
Justice White held that administrative law judges are entitled to absolute immunity 
from damages liability for their judicial acts.  Id. at 508–14. 
55 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980).  My position is that we are, indeed, like all 
other trial judges . . . and more.  Whereas a trial judge’s responsibility is to conduct 
trials before juries that determine the facts of a dispute, ALJs must determine both 
fact and law.  And moreover, we must articulate legitimate reasons for each fact 
that we decide.  Lengthy decision writing is typically the job of appellate judges, 
not trial judges.  See Daniel F. Solomon, Crafting ‘Substantial’ ALJ Decisions, 43 
JUDGES J. 23 (2004). 
    
Spring 2013 Fundamental Fairness    69 
 
could have been as high as $20 million annually.56  It was envisioned 
that in Washington, D.C. alone, consolidation of twenty-nine separate 
docketing offices would produce immense savings.57  Pooling of 
administrative staff, receptionists, docketing clerks and libraries 
would allow reduction of the support staff and could yield an 
estimated additional $10 to $15 million annually.58  Consolidation of 
physical facilities and resources would also result in a more efficient 
and economical operation of the administrative hearing process.  
Many law libraries and hearing rooms maintained for various 
agencies throughout the District of Columbia would no longer have 
been required.  Many hearings require travel as much as several 
weeks each month to conduct proceedings at remote hearing 
locations, and it was anticipated that the costs of travel could have 
been reduced.59  Finally, efficiency could also have been achieved by 
the unification or reconciliation of the nearly 280 different procedural 
and evidentiary rules currently used in departmental and agency 
adjudications.60  Seven divisions within the Corps would be 
maintained: 
 
1. Division of Communications, Public Utility and 
Transportation Regulations; 
2. Division of Safety and Environmental Regulation; 
3. Division of Labor; 
4. Division of Labor Relations; 
5. Division of Health and Benefits Programs; 
6. Division of Securities, Commodities, and Trade 
Regulation; and 
7. Division of General Programs and Grants.61 
 
In 1992 hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, 
Representatives of the ABA, the Federal Administrative Law Judges’ 
                                                 
56 Murphy Remarks, supra note 30. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  Murphy also noted that securing hearing rooms was often troublesome, 
and some hearings had to have been conducted in hotel rooms.  Id. 
61 The 1993, 103d Congress versions referred to eight divisions, covering the 
same topics. 
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Conference, and the Association of Administrative Law Judges 
testified for the Corps Bill.  Representatives from the Forum of the 
United States Administrative Law Judges (FORUM) and the 
Department of Justice testified in opposition.62  In 1993, the House 
and Senate bills were introduced simultaneously.63  SSA, the 
Department of Labor, and Department of Transportation filed official 
objections.  SSA argued that the primary impact of the bill would 
have been on the Department of Health and Human Services, which 
then encompassed SSA, as it employed more than seventy percent of 
all administrative law judges:  
 
A separate ALJ corps is inconsistent with the concept 
of administrative decisionmaking.  The authority for 
ALJs to make decisions in hearing cases is delegated 
to ALJs because the Secretary cannot personally hear 
and decide the cases.  Under the delegation, the ALJ 
acts on behalf of the Secretary, applying the 
Secretary's policies (as established through rules and 
regulations) to the individual fact situation in a 
particular case.  The ALJ does not, however, establish 
or create new policy.  The SSA ALJ's decision 
generally represents the final decision of the Secretary 
in a case (unless action is taken by the Appeals 
Council).  If the claimant disagrees with that final 
decision, he may file a civil action, and the 
Department of Justice defends the Secretary's final 
decision.  Thus, it would be inappropriate for an ALJ 
corps totally outside this Department to have the final 
                                                 
62 Administrative Law Judge Charles N. Bono testified for the ABA; 
Administrative Law Judge Melford O. Cleveland testified on behalf of the 
Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. (AALJ); Administrative Law 
Judge Victor Palmer testified on behalf of the Federal Administrative Law Judges 
Conference (FALJC).  Administrative Law Judge Bruce Birchman testified in 
opposition for the Forum of the United States Administrative Law Judges 
(FORUM).  FORUM had been organized by an indefinite number of administrative 
law judges, and probably represented less than five percent of all administrative 
law judges at the time.  Judge Birchman would not divulge number of members or 
provide the membership roster.  ACUS was conspicuously absent.   
63 H.R. 2586, 103d Cong. & S. 486, 103d Cong. (1993). 
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responsibility for making administrative decisions for 
the Secretary.64 
 
Internally within SSA, continuing ongoing discussions centered on 
how to replace administrative law judges.65 
Meanwhile, Congress was mulling over the Corps concept.  On 
May 21, 1991, the National Conference of Administrative Law 
Judges (NCALJ) and Judicial Division of the ABA wrote to OPM, 
pointing out that despite a mandate to do so, OPM had not taken a 
leadership role in the education of ALJs or the agencies as to the 
nature of their relationship, the judge’s function, or in the supervision 
or investigation of problems related to that relationship and function.  
OPM had not conducted or sponsored orientation programs for ALJs 
or their administrators; had not monitored the appointment of 
sufficient numbers of ALJs by agencies (although traditionally it 
carefully monitored appointments to prevent the appointment of too 
many); had not adopted or proposed uniform rules for conduct or 
procedure; had not determined how judges should handle continuing 
legal, let alone, judicial education; had not addressed how to handle 
support staff, office or hearing space; and had not investigated or 
made recommendations on any of these questions.  It also had never 
addressed the long-standing strife between the Social Security 
Administration and its administrative law judges, among other 
judicial independence issues. 
                                                 
64  CONG. REC., S16566 (daily ed. November 19, 1993).  
65 Bono, supra note 39.  In 1973, SSA acquired the state disability program, 
now known as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.  Judges who 
heard these cases were not considered to have been APA judges until 1976.  See 
Pub. L. No. 95–216, tit. III, § 371, 91 Stat. 1559.  See also SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC. 
OF THE HOUSE COMM. WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER (Comm. Print 1979). 
Actually, as described by Bono, SSA had discussed replacing ALJs openly.  In 
“Meet the Candid Bureaucrat,” Federal Times, July 16, 1976, James B. Cardwell, 
then Commissioner of Social Security, said that he would just as soon do away 
with administrative law judges in the hearings and appeals process.  He complained 
that they were too unpredictable and had too many “judicial trappings,” that the 
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, now SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review (ODAR), had strayed too far from the parental unit.  He expressed a desire 
to replace them with pre-APA presiding officers who would be more in tune with 
“agency policy.” 
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In Recommendation 92-7 of the 1992 Administrative Conference 
of the United States, the Federal Administrative Judiciary determined 
not to address proposals for an independent corps of ALJs.66 
                                                 
66 Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference 
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759; 61,760–
65 (Dec. 29, 1992).  “Congress should not at this time make structural changes 
more extensive than those proposed here, such as those in recent legislative 
proposals to establish a centralized corps of ALJs.”  57 Fed. Reg. 61,760. 
Among recommendations: (1) ALJs be appointed from a broader list of 
qualified applicants so as to include more women and minorities; (2) provision be 
made for peer review of ALJ performance; (3) some administrative judges (AJs) be 
converted to administrative law judges.  See id.  The ACUS investigation was 
performed by Professors Paul Verkuil, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Daniel Gifford, Charles 
Koch, and Richard Pierce.  
As an aside, Lubbers later wrote that the ACUS recommendations  
 
did not sit well with certain members of the ALJ community—
especially those that were pushing the centralized corps proposal.  
With a change in OPM leadership and some vocal opponents 
among ALJs, the ACUS recommendations died on the vine.  
Afterwards, several outspoken opponents bitterly criticized 
ACUS in correspondence with Congress, while other ALJs 
strongly defended the agency.  An objective observer who wrote 
a post-mortem on ACUS found that there was at least some 
evidence that this campaign on the part of some ALJs to discredit 
ACUS, aided by a hired lobbyist, had some impact on its ultimate 
defunding.   
 
Jeffrey Lubbers, Paul Verkuil’s Projects for the Administrative Conference of the 
U.S.: 1974–1992, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2421, 2441 (2011) (citing Toni M. Fine, A 
Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19, 58–61 (1998)).  Ms. Fine was apparently supplied the 
“objective” evidence during a symposium entitled, “Administrative Conference of 
the United States (‘ACUS’).”  However, there is no mention of the “Contract for 
America,” written by Larry Hunter, who was aided by House members Newt 
Gingrich, Robert Walker, Richard Armey, Bill Paxon, Tom DeLay, John Boehner 
and Jim Nussle, and in part using text from the 1985 State of the Union Address, 
the Contract detailed the actions to take if they became the majority.  Many of the 
Contract’s policy ideas originated at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think 
tank.  Among those was to retire “unneeded” agencies.  ACUS became one of 
them.  At the same time, the Clinton Administration was “reinventing 
government.”  A similar organization, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, which gave recommendations and advice, was also 
defunded.  In fact, during the debate on ACUS, former Congressman George 
Gekas, seen as the “godfather” to administrative law judges, who sponsored much 
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of the legislation favorable to administrative law judges, also favored funding 
ACUS, contrary to the implications applied by Lubbers and Fine.  The opposition 
to ACUS was expressed by Ernest Istook, R. Oklahoma: 
 
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this motion.  The motion 
simply asks the conferees to consistently uphold the position 
already taken by this House in defunding several small agencies 
that provide services which duplicate those that are or could be 
performed elsewhere within the Government.  
For example, regarding the Administrative Conference, their 
oversight function is basically to help other agencies to 
coordinate.  That function dealing with Federal regulations and 
administrative oversight can be performed within the Department 
of Justice.  It can be performed within the Office of Management 
and Budget which has subdivisions for an Office of General 
Management and also an Office for Informational and Regulatory 
Affairs.  
This is a case of duplication of services, Mr. Speaker, and if 
we are serious about trying to restrict the amount of Federal 
spending to bring down the Federal Government to size, if on the 
one hand we have responded favorably to the Government re-
invention initiatives of the Clinton administration and Vice 
President Gore, then to be consistent we have to vote that way.  
When we have Federal agencies that provide duplicative 
efforts, then we need to do away with those agencies and roll 
them up into the others that are doing the same job or can do the 
same job without extra personnel, without extra rent, without 
extra fringe benefits, without extra personnel policies, without 
extra budgets. 
The dollar amount here is fairly small, Mr. Speaker, in the 
scope of the national budget.  It is $7 million, but it is important 
to inform the public whether or not we are serious about 
downsizing the Federal Government.  If we are serious, we 
should vote the same way that we already voted previously in 
this House, in favor of this motion to instruct conferees.  If we 
vote any other way, we are backing down.  We are sending a 
message to the taxpayers around the country that we did not 
mean it when we said that we wanted to save their money and be 
more economical.  
 
Appointment of Conferees on H.R. 2403, Treasury, Postal Service, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 1994, 139 CONG. REC. 20563 (1993).  I am 
advised by Professor Lubbers that the ACUS budget was actually $2 million. 
I personally believe that whereas ACUS considered that the application of 
“veterans’ preference to the ALJ selection process has had a materially negative 
effect on the potential quality of the federal administrative judiciary,” objections to 
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The Corps Bill passed through the Senate in 1993, but was not 
sent to conference.  In the 104th Congress, co-sponsors of the Corps 
Bill included key Democratic sponsor, Howell Heflin, of Alabama, 
and Republican senators, such as Strom Thurmond, Richard S. 
Shelby, Hank Brown, William Cohen, and Arlen Specter. 
Although the Corps concept was accepted by both houses of 
Congress, it was not accepted simultaneously.  During a last ditch 
effort from 1993 to 1994, many of the provisions were diluted.  The 
question of judicial impartiality no longer seemed as important to 
Congress as it had been initially, and attempts at compromise failed.  
With the passage of time, it became clear that dissention among 
administrative law judges defeated the Corps Bill.  A small minority 
of administrative law judges objected, publicly contending that there 
would be a loss of expertise, alleged savings would be ephemeral, 
and that the proposed bill would shift political pressure to 
Congress.67 
Historically there had been a distinction between judges who 
were paid at the GS-16 scale and those, mostly at SSA, at the GS-15 
scale, in the General Schedule.68  The inference was that “regulatory” 
administrative law judges heard more complicated cases and, as 
inference upon that, the judges were more worthy.  Congress leveled 
the potential corps when the current pay system was established by 
the Federal Employee Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA).69  In 
private, the main reason for objection by GS-16 judges was that they 
resented that the former GS-15 judges had been “elevated,” and 
wanted a return to a hierarchy—they craved public notice that they 
were in superior status. 
By 1993, several concessions to SSA had been added to the 
language of the Corps Bill.  Some members of ACUS who did not 
accept that administrative law judges were “judges” who should have 
                                                 
ACUS from veterans’ groups had more influence on Congress than all other groups 
involved. 
67 See John Holmes, In Praise of the ALJ System, 21 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 
No. 4 (1996). 
68 Until 1975, some SSI judges were paid at the GS-14 scale, but were granted 
full APA status in 1976. 
69 FEPCA was enacted as Section 529 of the Treasury, Postal Service and 
General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389 
(1990). 
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any decisional independence, as well as some administrators at SSA, 
argued for an “efficiency of the service” standard for administrative 
law judges in SSA, to amend Section 11 of the APA, as the basis for 
discipline or removal.  After negotiations, as a matter of compromise, 
the latest version of the Corps Bill permitted authorization of 
performance and evaluation systems, as well as efficiency 
standards.70  In response to the changes, some of the same judges 
who argued for passage in 1992, objected one year later.71 
 
III. THE CONFERENCE CONCEPT 
For several years, representatives of several administrative law 
judge organizations, including FORUM had met to consider 
modifying or revising the corps bill.  The result became “The 
Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States Act,”72 
sponsored by former Representative George Gekas (R. Pa.), then 
Chair of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law, House Judiciary 
Committee.  All of the objections rendered by FORUM were 
addressed in the legislative intent section:  
 
(1) in order to promote efficiency, productivity, 
and the improvement of administrative functions, to 
enhance public service and public trust in the 
administrative resolution of disputes, and to enhance 
the enforcement of the administrative law provisions 
of title 5, United States Code, the Administrative Law 
Judge Conference of the United States should be 
established; 
(2) the existing system of permanent agency 
assignments of administrative law judges appointed 
under section 3015 of title 5, United States Code, will 
be enhanced, by creating the Administrative Law 
                                                 
70 See S. 486, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995). 
71 See Charles N. Bono, The Evolution and Role of the Administrative Law 
Judge at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the Social Security Administration, 
15 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 213, 238–39 (1995). 
72 Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States Act, H.R. 3961, 
105th Cong. (1998) (enacted). 
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Judge Conference of the United States and will serve 
the public with maximum economy and efficiency; 
(3) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of 
the United States will enhance legal specialization of 
administrative law judges by establishing initial and 
continuing education programs, after consulting with 
the appropriate agency, to insure that each such judge 
has the necessary training in the specialized field of 
law to hear cases assigned by the agency; 
(4) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of 
the United States will establish a system of 
administrative law judge professional accountability 
and implement a process to protect the public by 
establishing procedures to handle allegations of 
judicial misconduct; and 
(5) the Administrative Law Judge Conference of 
the United States will effect no change in the 
rulemaking, interpretative, or policymaking authority 
of an agency which would retain full authority to 
review and change administrative law judge 
decisions.73 
 
From 1998 to 2004, agencies were generally unable to hire new 
judges from the OPM register.  A second version of the Conference 
Bill was introduced in 2000, also sponsored by Representative 
Gekas.74  
Meanwhile, there were attacks to OPM’s management of the 
Register.  Applicants for the administrative law judge position 
challenged the scoring formula OPM used in 1996 to evaluate 
candidates for the position of administrative law judge.  They alleged 
that the policy violated OPM’s regulations and the Veterans’ 
Preference Act.  While that case, generally known as Azdell,75 was 
pending, OPM suspended the examination process for administrative 
law judges.  Therefore, the ALJ register became dated with one 
                                                 
73 Id.  
74 See H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000). 
75 Ultimately, known as Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
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exception: agencies could not hire judges from the ALJ register 
during this period.
76
  In Bush v. Office of Personnel Management,77 
after an applicant was rejected in his request to be given part of the 
ALJ examination, the Federal Circuit determined that the suspension 
of testing was a reviewable employment practice.
78
  On February 27, 
2004, the United States Supreme Court finally dismissed the requests 
for certiorari. 
Since 2000, neither a Corps Bill nor a Conference Bill has been 
offered.  As of the date of writing, all administrative law judge 
organizations continue to support the Conference concept, as well as 
the ABA and the Federal Bar Association.  However, there have been 
no further discussions in Congress. 
 
                                                 
76
 In 1997, the Azdell/Meeker lawsuit was filed, with disadvantaged plaintiffs 
asking that the 1996 rescoring process be overturned.  After many appeals, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals eventually upheld OPM’s original rescoring 
process in 2003.  Through most of the litigation, the ALJ register was suspended, 
and no hirings were allowed.  However, in August 2002, SSA was granted a waiver 
by OPM to hire 126 judges who would have qualified under any scoring formula.  
See Challenges Facing the New Commissioner of Social Security: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 107th 
Cong. (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
107hhrg83375/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg83375.pdf. 
77 315 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
78
 American Bar Association policy established that with respect to the 
recruitment and selection of ALJs employed by federal agencies, OPM and 
Congress, where necessary, were to develop strategies to increase the percentages 
of women and minority candidates, eliminate veterans’ preferences from this 
process, allow selection by agencies from a broader range of candidates for ALJ 
positions, and enhance OPM’s Office of Administrative Law Judges.  Although 
OPM facially adhered to these requests, it failed to administer the system during 
the period when it was involved in the Azdell litigation.  
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IV. COMPARISON: CORPS VS. CONFERENCE  
Corps Bill79 Conference Bill80 
All judges become employees of ALJ 
Corps in a new agency. 
Judges are employees of agencies of 
hire.  
New agency would replace the former 
OPM.  Office of Administrative Law 
Judges.81 
Chief Judge 
Appointed by the President with consent 
of the Senate. 
Nominated by 5 member nominating 
commission. 
Sends names of three candidates to 
President  
President can reject list and ask for 
another 5-year term. 
Chief Judge 
Appointed by the President with 
consent of the Senate.  
Must have served as an administrative 
law judge for at least 5 years 
immediately before the date of 
appointment.  
5-year term. 
Paid at the rate of 105 percent of 
basic pay for level IV of the 
Executive Schedule. 
7 divisions -- each headed by a division 
chief administrative law judge appointed 
by the President. 
5 year terms.  
Judges remain with their agencies.82 
The chief administrative law judge of 
each agency shall be appointed by the 
agency head. 
                                                 
79 References are to the Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary 
Act, S. 486, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted). 
80 References are to the Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United 
States Act, H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).  
81 “All functions of the Office of Personnel Management with respect to 
administrative law judges are transferred to the Conference.”  Administrative Law 
Judge Conference of the United States Act, H.R. 5177, 106th Cong. (2000). 
82 It is stated:  
 
After selection for appointment to the position of administrative 
law judge by an agency, the administrative law judge shall be 
assigned by the chief judge to such agency for the adjudication of 
cases for the agency.  Each administrative law judge appointed at 
the time of the date of enactment of this section shall be assigned 
to the agency the administrative law judge was assigned to at the 
time of the date of enactment of this section.  Subsequent 
assignments of the administrative law judge shall be made with 
the consent of the administrative law judge and the appointing 
agency. 
 
Id. 
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OPM retains primary duties. OPM duties assumed by the 
Conference.83 
Administrative law judges are 
generalists.
84
  
Administrative law judges remain 
specialists. 
Appeals process remains intact.
85 Appeals process remains intact. 
                                                 
83 The Conference Bill provided:  
 
There shall be transferred to the Administrative Law Judge 
Conference of the United States established under section 598 of 
title 5, United States Code, the personnel, property, unexpended 
balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds employed 
and held by the Office of Personnel Management and relating to 
the administrative law function administered by the Office of 
Personnel Management.  Appropriations, authorizations, 
allocations, and other funds paid or transferred by agencies to the 
Office of Personnel Management for the administration of the 
administrative law judge function shall, after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, be paid or transferred to the Conference. 
 
Id. at 8–9.  
84 The Corps Bill stated: 
 
An administrative law judge who is a member of the Corps shall 
hear and render a decision upon— 
(1) every case of adjudication subject to the provisions of 
section 553, 554, or 556; (2) every case in which hearings are 
required by law to be held in accordance with sections 553,  554, 
or section 556; (3) every other case referred to the Corps by an 
agency in which a determination is to be made on the record after 
an opportunity for a hearing; and (4) every case referred to the 
Corps by a court for an administrative law judge to act as a 
special master or to otherwise making findings of fact on behalf 
of the referring court, which shall continue to have exclusive and 
undiminished jurisdiction over the case. 
 
S. 486, 104th Cong., at 14 (1995). 
85 The Corps Bill further provided:  
 
The provisions of this subchapter shall effect no change in— 
(1) an agency’s rulemaking, interpretative, or policymaking 
authority in carrying out the statutory responsibilities vested in 
the agency or agency head; 
(2) the adjudicatory authority of administrative law judges; or 
(3) the authority of an agency to review decisions of 
administrative law judges under any applicable provision of law. 
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However, studies of the entire appeals 
process is mandated.
86  
A report after two 
years is required. 
Corps budget assumes all expenses for 
individual judges. 
Conference has a budget but each 
agency responsible for all budget, 
resources and support requirements 
on a per capita basis.87 
Collective bargaining agreements and 
other contracts remain in effect. 
Collective bargaining agreements and 
other contracts remain in effect. 
Judicial Council 
     Power similar to agency authority.
88 
MSPB system remains,90 but a 
                                                 
 
Id. at 15–16. 
86 The studies were to conform with the following:  
 
The chief administrative law judge of the Administrative Law Judge 
Corps of the United States shall conduct a study of the various types and 
levels of agency review to which decisions of administrative law judges 
are subject.  A separate study shall be conducted for each division of the 
Corps.  The studies shall include monitoring and evaluating data and shall 
be conducted in consultation with the division chief judges, the Chairman 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, and the agencies 
that review the decisions of administrative law judges. 
   
Id. at 24–25. 
87  In the 2000 version of the Conference Bill, $5,000,000 was to have been 
appropriated.  H.R. 5177, 106th Cong., at 8 (2000). 
88 The Corps Bill stated:  
 
(1) to assign judges to divisions and transfer or reassign judges 
from one division to another, subject to the provisions of section 
599c; 
(2) to appoint persons as administrative law judges under section 
599c; 
(3) to file charges seeking adverse action against an 
administrative law judge under section 599e; 
(4) to prescribe, after providing an opportunity for notice and 
comment, the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of 
proceedings before the Corps, except that, with respect to a 
category of proceedings adjudicated by an agency before the 
effective date of the Reorganization of the Federal 
Administrative Judiciary Act, the Council may not amend or 
revise the rules of practice and procedure prescribed by that 
agency during the 2 years following such effective date without 
the approval of that agency, and any amendments or revisions 
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     Hears discipline cases – replaces 
MSPB 
          Removal, suspension, reprimand 
voluntary alternative dispute 
resolution process would be created 
that shall be conducted at the request 
                                                 
made to such rules shall not affect or be applied to any pending 
action; 
(5) to issue such rules and regulations as may be appropriate for 
the efficient conduct of the business of the Corps and the 
implementation of this subchapter, including the assignment of 
cases to administrative law judges; 
(6) subject to the civil service and classification laws and 
regulations– 
(A) to select, appoint, employ, and fix the compensation of 
the employees (other than administrative law judges) that the 
Council deems necessary to carry out the functions, powers, 
and duties of the Corps; and 
(B) to prescribe the authority and duties of such employees; 
(7) to establish, abolish, alter, consolidate, and maintain such 
regional, district, and other field offices as are necessary to carry 
out the functions, powers, and duties of the Corps and to assign 
and reassign employees to such field offices; 
(8) to procure temporary and intermittent services under section 
3109; 
(9) to enter into, to the extent or in such amounts as are 
authorized in appropriation Acts, without regard to section 3709 
of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. § 5), 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions 
that may be necessary to conduct the business of the Corps; 
(10) to delegate any of the chief judge’s functions or powers with 
the consent of the chief judge, or whenever the office of such 
chief judge is vacant, to one or more division chief judges or 
other employees of the Corps, and to authorize the redelegation 
of any of those functions or powers; 
(11) to establish, after consulting with an agency, initial and 
continuing educational programs to assure that each 
administrative law judge assigned to hear cases of that agency 
has the necessary training in the specialized field of law of that 
agency; 
(12) to make suitable arrangements for continuing education and 
training of other employees of the Corps, so that the level of 
expertise in the divisions of the Corps will be maintained and 
enhanced; and 
(13) to determine all other matters of general policy of the Corps. 
 
Id. at 9–12.  
90 “An administrative law judge may not be removed, suspended, reprimanded, 
or disciplined except as provided in section 7521.”  H.R. 5177, at 7.  
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on grounds:  
               Incompetence 
               Neglect of duties 
                Misconduct 
                Physical or mental disability 
     Concurrent peer review system and a 
“Complaints Resolution Board” 
established comprised of judges and 16 
attorneys.
89 
of the administrative law judge.  
Emphasis added.91 
Rules of practice can be prescribed by 
Council after two years. 
     During first two years agency rules in 
use 
No mention of rules of practice.  
However, Chief Judge can initiate 
rules and procedures to implement the 
functions of the Conference.  
Additional jurisdiction: 
Agency and court referral: 
With agency approval, courts are 
authorized to refer cases, “or portions 
thereof,”92 to act as a special master to 
make findings of fact subject to de novo 
review by the referring court. 
93 
Additional jurisdiction: 
Court referral: 
 With agency approval, courts are 
authorized to refer cases, “or portions 
thereof,” to act as a special master to 
make findings of fact subject to de 
novo review by the referring court.94 
Special Functions of Chief Judge:  
 “[T]raining of judges in more 
than one subject area;  
 [E]mployment information 
technology . . . [for] case 
 
                                                 
89 The Corps Bill mentioned:  
 
Under regulations issued by the Council, a Complaints 
Resolution Board shall be established within the Corps to 
consider and to recommend appropriate action to be taken when a 
complaint is made concerning conduct of a judge of the Corps. 
Such complaint may be made by any interested person, including 
parties, practitioners, the chief judge, administrative law judges, 
and agencies. 
 
S. 486, 104th Cong., at 17–18 (1995). 
91  The 1998 version of the Conference Bill established a peer review system. 
92 S. 486, at 15. 
93 The court shall provide for reimbursement to the agency involved for costs 
relating to the administrative law judge referral. 
94 The court shall provide for reimbursement to the agency involved for costs 
relating to the administrative law judge referral. 
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docketing, and research;  
 [C]onsolidating hearing 
facilities and law libraries; and  
 [P]rograms and practices to 
foster overall efficient use of 
staff, personnel, equipment, and 
facilities.”95  
Issues an annual written report to the 
President and the Congress.  
 
V. ONGOING QUEST VIA OPM 
As set forth above, the APA contemplated that the Civil Service 
Commission (now OPM)96 would oversee merit selection and 
appointment of ALJs and would also act as an ombudsman for the 
ALJ program, but OPM has essentially abandoned that role.  Section 
1305 provides that, for the purpose of Sections 3105 (appointment), 
3344 (loans), and 5372 (pay), OPM “may . . . investigate, prescribe 
regulations, appoint advisory committees as necessary, recommend 
legislation, subpoena witnesses and records, and pay witness fees.”97  
Although the OPM Program Handbook affirms those responsibilities, 
OPM has seldom exercised them, except for prescribing regulations, 
including sometimes less-than-benign changes in selection and 
Reduction in Force regulations.98  Judges are selected through a 
special process, which provides for a register of qualified applicants 
overseen by OPM.  Judges’ pay is set by statute and OPM 
regulations.  Any attempt by an agency to discipline or remove a 
judge requires a formal hearing by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board.  Judges are also exempt from the performance appraisal 
requirements applicable to almost all other Federal employees under 
the Civil Service Reform Act. 
                                                 
95 S. 486, at 5–6. 
96 Administration of the ALJ program was originally placed in the Civil 
Service Commission and was subsequently bifurcated to the OPM and the Merit 
Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 
97 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006). 
98 See Appointment, Pay, and Removal of Administrative Law Judges, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8,874 (proposed Feb. 23, 1998). 
    
84          Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary    33-1 
 
The APA attempted to bring uniformity to a field full of variation 
and diversity.
99
  This variation is especially true since the APA 
permits some agencies to borrow administrative law judges to hold 
hearings.100  Parties have a right to know what the rules will be, and 
in the current state, there is confusion.  The 1992 ACUS proposal 
supported the use of practice rules.101 
 
A. Qualifications of Applicants to Administrative Law Judge 
Register 
Historically, OPM developed the criteria for judicial selection, 
accepted applications and rated them on the basis of experience as 
described in (1) a lengthy statement prepared by the applicant, (2) a 
personal reference inquiry, (3) a written demonstration of decision-
writing ability, and (4) a panel interview.  The scores from this 
process determined an applicant’s rank on the Register.  OPM rated 
and ranked candidates on a scale from 70 to 100.  When an agency 
needed to fill a vacancy, OPM certified the top three ranked 
applicants on the register to that agency.  Also historically, only 
applicants with scores from 85 to 100 were certified.102 
OPM issued a final rule in March 2007 eliminating OPM 
Examination Announcement No. 318—the rule instructed applicants 
to apply during a fixed time period, and all applicants were screened 
by the administration of (1) a written examination, (2) an 
interviewing process, and (3) a scoring of qualifications.  However, it 
has since opened the Register to a haphazard “race to the mailbox” 
method; otherwise qualified applicants are summarily rejected.  OPM 
has arbitrarily rejected applicants for the ALJ Register on several 
occasions. For example, Vacancy Announcement No. 2008ALJ 
134575, issued on July 30, 2008, limited applicants to the first six 
                                                 
99
 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2006).  
100 At my agency, judges hear approximately eighty different types of cases, 
with differing time lines and procedures. 
101 See 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993).  “To ensure that ALJs and affected persons 
are aware of their responsibilities, agencies should articulate their policies through 
rules of general applicability, a system of precedential decisions, or other 
appropriate practices.”  Id. 
102  Application of the Veterans’ Preference Act can provide an extra five 
points; disabled veterans can receive an extra ten points in their scores.  
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hundred.  Although the applications were supposedly open until 
August 13, 2008, applications were closed within eighteen hours, on 
July 31st. 
OPM develops an ALJ Register of qualified applicants to submit 
to the agencies who certify a need to hire administrative law judges.  
Historically, many applicants were former or sitting state judges, as 
well as former military judges and state administrative law judges.103  
Some have been Federal magistrates.  However, some applicants who 
are in judicial status in their home states are deemed unqualified if 
they are not “active” lawyers.  ABA policy supports using prior 
judicial experience as a factor.104  It is important to ensure that the 
federal government can attract highly qualified candidates for the 
administrative law judge position, and the laws, regulations, and 
practices of the various state bars should be controlling in the 
classification of members of the judiciary, whether administrative or 
otherwise. 
Although OPM is required to provide hiring agencies a list of the 
three best qualified applicants, ACUS recommended that a hiring 
agency should be permitted to select any applicant from the 
certificate who, in the agency’s opinion, possesses the qualifications 
for the particular position to be filled, and an agency may request that 
OPM provide an additional number of names upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances.105  The main reason that ACUS made the 
suggestion was because it determined that veterans are precluding 
agencies from hiring a more diverse cadre.106 
                                                 
103 Social Security Administration judges included Judge Joseph Simeone, a 
former justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, and Judge Tom Allen, a former 
justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, among other notables.  Others included at 
least one former military general, an admiral and many former chief military trial 
and appellate judges. 
104 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb. 
2009), available ar 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2009/midyear/re
commendations/112.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
105 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7. 
106 ACUS also stated that although there was no evidence of bias against 
certain classes of litigants, it recommended further investigation, especially at SSA.  
It referenced a report, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HRD-92-56, 
SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN DISABILITY DECISIONS WARRANTS 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION (1992), and the report, NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS 
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Congress intended that trial experience should be a primary 
qualification for the position.  There has also been a longstanding 
debate regarding whether agencies should hire candidates using a 
“select criterion”—or those who have agency specific knowledge.  
The current law requires trial experience and or the equivalent, 
without regard to special agency knowledge.  ABA policy rejects 
select criterion.  Accusations have been made that the current register 
is filled by candidates with no trial experience, because OPM sees 
itself as an agent to “customer” agencies, especially SSA, and has 
stacked the register to suit agency demands. 
There is absolutely no evidence that veterans are less qualified 
than the general population of applicants.  To the contrary, evidence 
from the Azdell litigation shows that in the main, they are better 
qualified. 
Some chief judges of the regulatory agencies have complained to 
OPM that there are no qualified candidates in the register because it 
is filled by former SSA decision writers, who have no trial 
experience.  The ABA and other bar groups have opposed “selective 
certification” because some of the candidates appear to be less 
qualified to manage conflicts and marshal evidence, and also because 
of the appearance of agency bias.   
In a recent development, SSA has convinced OPM to accept a 
“split” register so that, in essence, SSA will have its own register 
                                                 
TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT (Discussion Draft) (July 1992) at 93–103 
(discussing gender bias issues relating to disability determinations); no evidence 
had been produced, and in fact, the GAO study did not establish any proof of 
discrimination, either in hiring or in decision making.  
Professor Lubbers advised me that ACUS did show (through statistics) that 
veterans’ preference was hampering the selection of women, but ACUS also 
suggested allowing agencies to choose anyone from the top 50% of the register 
because it felt that agencies should be afforded more flexibility in choosing 
eligibles with the background they needed for their ALJs.  Lubbers stated: “You 
don’t really address the main reason for ACUS’s proposed changes in ALJ 
selection—the fact that agencies were (and still are) circumventing the register by 
hiring laterally from SSA.” 
However, as stated, at about the same time, GAO investigated complaints of 
bias and discrimination at then OHA.  It never made a finding, and did not publish 
the study.  From this, I assume that no bias or discrimination was proven.  
I do not have the statistics, but anecdotally, I will testify that at my agency, and 
at many others, the veterans hired include a large percentage of women, most of 
whom were JAG officers and judicial officers.  
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comprised of candidates who have only agency decision writing 
experience, and the other agencies will have a register comprised of 
candidates with trial experience. 
 
B. Active Bar Membership 
Historically, none of the regulations under the APA required 
active bar membership status for administrative law judges.107  
Effective April 19, 2007, 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 established a 
requirement that incumbent Administrative Law Judges maintain 
active bar status.108 
Licensure in each state is distinct.  Although some states have 
reciprocity for membership, some do not.  Moreover, some judges 
live and work in states where all lawyers and judges are required to 
be members of the bar, while others are prohibited from being 
members of the bar because it is considered both inappropriate and 
unethical for judges to be subject to discipline by a body consisting 
                                                 
107 In fact, James R. Rucker, Jr., then SSA’s Chief Administrative Law Judge, 
issued a Memorandum dated January 9, 1989, stating that OPM did not require 
active bar membership after appointment.  On December 13, 2005, OPM published 
its initial Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (NPRM).  Examining System and 
Programs For Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 70 Fed. Reg. 
73646 (Dec. 13, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 337 & 930).  On December 
21, 2005, OPM republished its NPRM “due to information that was inadvertently 
omitted” from the December 13, 2005 NPRM.  See Examining System and 
Programs For Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 70 Fed. Reg. 
75745 (Dec. 21, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 337 & 930). 
108 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (2009). 
 
In 1998 and 1999, OPM advised ALJs that they are required to 
maintain active bar status to retain their status as ALJs, although 
there is no provision in the OPM regulations granting authority to 
do so.  Unlike attorneys, ALJs are barred from the practice of law 
by the Code of Judicial Conduct, which has been applied to ALJs 
by the Merit Systems Protection Board (In re Chocallo, 1 
MSPBR 612, 651 (1978)) and by some agency regulations.  In 
some states, Federal ALJs, like other judges, cannot be members 
of the state bar—e.g. Alabama. 
 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 6 n.17. 
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of and controlled by practicing attorneys.  Moreover many judges are 
not members of the bar where they reside or where they may work.109 
In many states, administrative law judges are entitled to judicial 
status.  In many others, there may not be a judicial category, per se, 
but administrative law judges, as members of the judiciary, may be 
exempt from continuing legal education.110  However, some states 
prohibit judges from the active practice of law.  For example, 
Delaware Supreme Court Rule 69(e) provides that “Judicial 
members” of the Delaware Bar are “those judges, commissioners and 
masters who are disqualified from the practice of law and those 
retired judges who do not practice law.”111  In addition, “judicial 
members are exempt from the process of annual registration with the 
Court.”112 
AALJ filed suit in 2007.  After the Court denied a Motion to 
Dismiss, OPM agreed to modify the regulation, which it did as to full 
time judges on October 7, 2010.113  However, the AALJ v. U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management case has not been dismissed as of this 
writing, and the case remains open.114 
 
                                                 
109 For example, I live in Maryland and, although my office is in the District of 
Columbia, most of my cases are on the road; I have exposure to every state, 
territory and even foreign countries.  I am a member of the Pennsylvania and 
Florida bars.  In Pennsylvania I must register with the Prothonotary of the Supreme 
Court, through the state Disciplinary Board.  I am exempt from mandatory CLE 
due to my judicial status.  I could have waived into Maryland or the District of 
Columbia, but only through my Pennsylvania qualifications, as there is no 
reciprocity with Florida.  Some non-resident judges are admitted in states like 
Indiana, and although they may not reside there, and do not hold hearings there, 
must meet a state CLE requirement. 
110 State requirements are tracked in David. L. Agatstein, Active Bar 
Membership, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 496 (2007). 
111 See DELAWARE STATE COURTS, http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/#supreme 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
112 Id. 
113  Programs for Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous), 75 
Fed. Reg. 61,998 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified 5 C.F.R. pt 930).    
114 640 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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C. Ethics 
OPM has refused to consider a code of conduct for administrative 
law judges.115  All administrative law judge organizations promote 
high standards.116  This is consistent with case law that judges should 
be held accountable under appropriate ethical standards adapted from 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
117
  Although no standard 
judicial codes apply by law or regulation, the Merit Systems 
Protection Board has referenced the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct starting with In re Chocallo.118  The 2001 Model Code, 
especially Canon 1, Rule 1.2, has been used extensively: “A judge 
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and 
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”119  SSA 
has recently prosecuted administrative law judges using standards 
                                                 
115 Professor Lubbers had asked for authority for this statement:  
 
I personally was involved during the 1992–1993 period 
when SSA tried to adopt a code.  Judge Ronnie A. Yoder was the 
principal author of the 1989 NCALJ Code for Administrative 
Law Judges, and he, and several other members of NCALJ met 
with OPM, among other entities. 
I was an officer in the ABA/NCALJ when we discussed use 
of the Codes as a substitute for performance evaluations during 
the Bush Administration.  Office of Personnel Management 
Associate Director for Strategic Human Resources Policy, Ron 
Sanders, was the principal OPM negotiator.  For the record, 
NCALJ was opposed to any “surrogate.”  FORUM advocated for 
the surrogate. 
 
116 Administrative law judges should be governed by the 2009 Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges, administered by the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.  Other Judicial groups have voluntarily sought and have 
received coverage: “Certain provisions of this Code apply to special masters and 
commissioners . . . . The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have adopted this Code.”  See 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited
StatesJudges.aspx (click on “Introduction”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).  
117
 ABA DIV. FOR POLICY ADMIN., 2012–2013 ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
HANDBOOK 193 (2012) [hereinafter “ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES”]. 
118 1 MSPBR 612, 651 (1978) 
119 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, R. 1.2 (2007). 
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that are not included in any judicial code, such as “conduct 
unbecoming an administrative law judge.”120   
Although OPM did not actively participate, in October 1992 the 
SSA Division of Regulations and Rulings drafted and distributed a 
proposed “Code of Conduct” for administrative law judges.  
Although the code would probably been acceptable to all 
administrative law judge organizations, concerns were raised by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and by the Office of Government Ethics 
(OGE) about the proposed code at that time.121  In March 1995, 
another draft was sent to be cleared for publication.  It referenced the 
Unified Corps Bill S. 486 (1994) and included language concerning 
the efficiency of case management and extent of cooperation with 
administrative directives as criteria for misconduct.122  However, it 
was not published.123 
 
D. Performance Reviews and “Discipline” 
Whereas the APA specifically forbids performance standards and 
reviews, in an attempt to reduce the implication of bias toward the 
employing agency, ACUS recommended a system of review.  It 
recommended case processing guidelines, which would address 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Long v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(upholding removal based on facts arising from off-duty conduct in a domestic 
relations dispute); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Steverson, 2009 M.S.P.B. 143 (upholding 
the removal of an administrative law judge based upon four charges including, but 
not limited to, off-duty conduct unbecoming an administrative law judge, off-duty 
misuse of government equipment in storing sexually-oriented material on his 
government-issued computer and in maintaining a private business, and lack of 
candor), aff’d, 383 F. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
121 In 1993, I attended a discussion at the William and Mary Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law with proponents and opponents of the proposed SSA and the 
NCALJ Code.  Although there were no compelling substantive objections, the 
OGE general counsel objected, arguing that as administrative law judges are 
“mere” employees, any code would conflict with agency responsibilities, and OGE 
rules, as well as specific agency codes.  At the time, SSA opposed this view.  
Another complicating factor is that OPM took the position that as all judges were 
members of a bar, the states’ codes would overlay the proposed codes.  We 
reminded them that Article III judges and most Article I judges have no such 
problem. 
122 Bono, supra note 39, at 243–44. 
123 Id. 
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issues such as “productivity and step-by-step time goals, [and] would 
be one of the bases upon which Chief ALJs would conduct regular 
(e.g., annual) performance reviews.”124   
ACUS also recommended that judicial comportment and 
demeanor would be reviewed.  
 
Another factor on the list of bases for performance 
review, which list is not intended to be exclusive, 
would be the existence of a clear disregard of, or 
pattern of non-adherence to, properly articulated and 
disseminated rules, procedures, precedents and other 
agency policy.  Such performance review systems 
need not involve quantitative measures or specific 
performance levels, but they should provide 
meaningful and useful feedback on performance.125 
Since 1992, although performance reviews have not been 
performed, SSA has been maintaining production guidelines.  
Although administrative law judges have been removed through the 
MSPB system, none have been removed for low production per se.  
Almost all recent removal cases involve SSA.  Ironically, at least two 
of the judges removed were SSA manager-judges, Hearing Office 
Chief Administrative Law Judges (HOCALJ).126  Many other 
management judges have been demoted, although these are not well 
documented.127 
                                                 
124 Recommendation 92-7, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993).  
125 Id. 
126 Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Soc. Sec. Admin. 
v. Harty, 117 F. App’x 733 (2004).  Carr was removed for (1) reckless disregard 
for personal safety, (2) persistent use of vulgar and profane language, (3) 
demeaning comments, sexual harassment and ridicule, and (4) interference with 
efficient and effective agency operations.  Harty was removed for failure to 
perform his assigned duties and for engaging in unprofessional and injudicious 
conduct or making unprofessional or injudicious statements to agency employees.  
127 In Butler v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 331 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a former 
HOCALJ alleged that he was demoted in retaliation for his support of grievances 
filed by other administrative law judges.  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that because he did not suffer a reduction in pay or grade upon losing his 
Hearing Office Chief duties, his demotion was not a “reassignment,” and therefore 
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The accusation that SSA is obsessed with production remains.  In 
at least one office, thousands of disability awards were rendered 
“prematurely,” ostensibly rendered to impress management.  After 
the HOCALJ was confronted, he allegedly committed suicide.  After 
an Inspector General investigation, the office supervisor was 
threatened with a fine of $3.5 million, another employee has been 
assessed a fine of $215,000, and two other employees were notified 
that they may have been fined more than $100,000 each.128  Another 
judge awarded benefits to 2,285 applicants in 2007, at a cost to 
taxpayers of $2.1 billion.129 
 
E. Peer Review 
The 1992 ACUS report recommended that chief judges, either 
individually or through a peer review group, receive and investigate 
such complaints or allegations, and recommend appropriate 
corrective or disciplinary actions.  The Conference Bill would have 
provided for a voluntary alternative dispute resolution process. 
At my agency, advisory committees were established in 1981 to 
conduct informal inquiries and to consider and recommend 
appropriate action regarding complaints of misconduct or 
disability.130  Apparently no other agency has a similar process. 
                                                 
he had no standing to protect his former position.  Id. at 1373.  There is no 
determination how many other similar actions have occurred. 
128 Stephen Barr, A Fight Over Fines for Social Security Workers, THE WASH. 
POST (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011500975.html. 
129 Mark Friesen, Paying Out Billions, One Judge Attracts Criticism, THE 
OREGONIAN (Dec. 29, 2008), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/special/index.ssf/2008/12/paying_out_billions_one_jud
ge.html. 
130 Procedures for Internal Handling of Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 46 
C.F.R. § 28050 (1981), as amended; Amended Procedures for Internal Handling of 
Complaints of Misconduct or Disability, 48 C.F.R. § 30843 (1983); Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, Amended Procedures for Internal Handling of 
Complaints of Misconduct or Disability, 52 C.F.R. § 32973 (1987).  The function 
of the committee is advisory only.  “Its inquiry and report in each instances shall be 
confined to the specific matter referred to it and shall contain no evaluation of the 
performance or qualifications of the affected judge contrary to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”  
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AALJ has recommended something similar at SSA, but nothing 
has been initiated.  SSA has several complaint procedures, primary 
due to complaints of bias,131 and does administer a program of 
“counseling.”  Judges have complained that the agency has fostered 
some of the complaints, to scapegoat certain judges. 
 
F. Professionalism 
Although OPM should promote continuing judicial education, it 
has done nothing in this area.  ABA policy encourages continuing 
legal education.
132
 
Although agencies used to provide continuing legal education for 
their judges, many current budgets do not permit it. 
 
G. Chief Judges 
At present, no agency chief judge is directly accountable to 
Congress.  Both the Corps and Conference concepts would require 
Presidential appointment of a chief with Senate confirmation. 
In a handful of cases, some chief judges have defended due 
process, and, unfortunately, have been restrained.  At SSA, the Chief 
Judge position is so far down on the pecking order that, on many 
occasions, decisions on how to manage the program are made 
without any input from any judge.133 
                                                 
131  Claimants and their advocates or representatives may file a bias complaint 
against a judge.  “Persons may make complaints in writing to our Office of the 
Chief Administrative Law Judge and to our regional and hearing offices.  We also 
receive complaints through our Appeals Council,” also through a telephone and 
I.G. Hotlines, “and congressional offices on behalf of their constituents.  We 
review, investigate, and respond to such complaints.”  75 Fed. Reg., 35, at 8171–76 
(Feb. 23, 2010). 
132
 ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES, supra note 117, at 268. 
133 The chief judge reported to the deputy associate commissioner, who 
reported to the associate commissioner, who reported to the deputy commissioner 
for disability, who reported to the principal deputy commissioner, who reported to 
the commissioner.  See JUDGE LONDON STEVERSON, CONFESSIONS OF A SOCIAL 
SECURITY JUDGE 372 (2010) (“SSA’s attempt during the summer of 1999 to 
discharge the Chief ALJ for reasons not related to good cause”).  A proposed bill 
was circulated at the height of the acrimony over HPI that would have required 
presidential appointment and direct reporting authority.  When members of the 
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Both the Corps and Conference would require a term and 
reporting authority directly to Congress. 
 
VI.   MINI-CORPS 
As stated above, to promote judicial and administrative efficiency 
and consistency, Professor Lubbers suggested an experiment, of 
uniting seventeen similar small regulatory agencies.  Combined, 
these agencies might have approached the budget and manpower of a 
couple of large SSA hearings offices, and at the time, SSA had over a 
hundred hearing offices.  None of the seventeen had been accused of 
violations of section 11 of the APA, whereas judges at SSA still 
maintain that SSA remains unconscionably obsessive about 
“production” and indolent about “quality.”  Although SSA judges 
now produce far more decisions in faster time, the judges allege that 
agency hostility to the rank and file remains, and that judges continue 
to make convenient scapegoats for agency failures. 
Although the Conference concept is still policy of the AALJ, the 
union at SSA, there has been an open discussion on the feasibility of 
renewing the Corps concept, or a Mini-Corps, if only for SSA.  After 
a 1999 Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) election, AALJ 
became the exclusive representative of all full-time and part-time 
non-supervisory administrative law judges.  Today, SSA’s Office of 
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR) consists of the Office 
of the Chief Administrative Law Judge at the top of an organizational 
pyramid; four National Hearing Centers (sixty-two supervisory 
judges) and ten Regional Offices (ten supervisory ALJs).  Hearing 
Offices, numbering 157, report to the regional chief judges, each with 
its own hearing office chief judges (157 “HOCALJ” judges) and one 
or more bargaining unit non-supervisory ALJs.  In fiscal year 2012, 
AALJ represented 1,266 bargaining unit members.  Under the FLRA, 
“supervisors” cannot be part of the bargaining units.  However, under 
a program of “re-configuration,” SSA does not permit administrative 
law judges to direct or rate office employees, who are represented by 
other unions.  One major impetus for unionization was the 
implementation of the Hearing Process Improvement Plan (“HPI”), 
                                                 
House Subcommittee and staff inquired, the chief judge was barred from speaking 
to them.  The issue was whether SSA would retain the due process hearing.  
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which was designed to minimize the role of the judge in the hearing 
process.134 
SSA and CMS (the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid) are the 
only APA agencies that use a “non-adversarial” system.135  Initially, 
both were housed within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”), formerly known as the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (“HEW”).  Subsequently, SSA was 
“separated” from HHS.  Until 2003, SSA administrative law judges 
heard a large majority of the cases now heard by CMS.136 
The major complaint about SSA disability programs is that it is 
slow and that there is a backlog of cases.  In the Joint Hearing on 
Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog, the late Judge 
Ronald A. Bernoski testified: “It is critical to understand that 
currently, of the 765,000 total pending cases, over 455,000 of them, 
60% of the total backlog, are waiting in the hearing offices to be 
worked up for a judge to review.  This is the precise location of the 
blockage causing the backlog.”137 
 
Factors Judge Bernoski also identified:   
 
 The ratio of staff to judge,  
                                                 
134 According to the agency, the plan sought to reduce “1) the high number of 
hearing office staff involved in preparing a case for a hearing; 2) the ‘stove pipe’ 
nature of employees’ job duties; and 3) inadequate management information 
necessary to monitor and track each case through the process.”  Statement of 
Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration before the 
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security, 112th Cong. 11–
13 (June 27, 2012).  A few of the changes HPI made to hearing office organization, 
such as creating the position of hearing office director, are still in place, but 
Congress would not fund it.  See id.  
135 Under Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 
Congress authorized the Social Security Administration to promulgate regulations 
regarding entitlement to benefits for miners totally disabled due to coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis.  These regulations are codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 410, subpart D.  
Part 410 applies to claims filed on or before December 31, 1973.  20 C.F.R. § 
410.231.  A few of these claims survive, and are “non-adversarial.” 
136 SSA administrative law judges heard Medicare Part A and Part B cases, 
while HHS administrative law judges heard Part C cases. 
137 Joint Hearing on Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog: Before 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 2 (Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of 
ALJ. Ronald G. Bernoski). 
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 Quality and composition of the staff,  
 State Agency Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) 
allowance rates,  
 Quality of case development, and  
 Availability of worked-up cases for hearings.  
 
Additional factors are: continued inadequate funding for Social 
Security; the failure of SSA to hire adequate support staff for judges; 
the failure of Social Security to manage and forecast the impact of 
the baby boomers; increased case receipts during the mid-1990’s; the 
failure of the agency to implement a plan to address the same; and 
the failure of many of SSA’s reform initiatives.138 
                                                 
138  In my experience the main factors for the backlog were: 
1. Failure of certain state DDS agencies to award benefits in clear cases.  
Although the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has identified certain 
states with a significantly higher incidence of disease than others, these 
statistics are not consistent with DDS payment rates in those states, or 
rates of payment at the hearings level.  Some state DDS’s have been 
accused of sending on meritorious claims that should have never been 
sent to the hearings level.  In some instances, certain DDS’s have been 
accused of creating alleged conflicts in the evidence, to avoid payment, 
when there is enough affirmative evidence to render a favorable decision.  
For example, see the CBS Television series, Failing the Disabled, 2008–
2009.  Failing the Disabled, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-3718129.html.  “Nobody 
cares if a case is denied.  If you approve it, it will be subjected to intense 
scrutiny,” one former DDS examiner stated.  Disabled and Waiting, 
CBSNEWS, (Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Trisha Cardillo).  In many 
states, DDS’s refuse to thoroughly develop the medical and vocational 
evidence, refuse to process (or mark) documents, cull out duplicates or 
develop an exhibit list to avoid having the hearing office to reconstruct 
every file before evidence can be entered into the record.  Failing the 
Disabled, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-
500690_162-3718129.html. 
2. Failure of ODAR to include judges in the chain of command of the 
hearing office staff.  Although the staff is supposed to support the 
hearings process, they are not supervised by judges who are singularly 
responsible for the work product. 
3. Too much time and money are devoted to development of cases that do 
not involve needy claimants.  For example, whereas claimants who are 
not in payment status desperately wait for payment, many of the cases at 
the hearing level involve disputes over onset dates for people already 
receiving reduced retirement benefits, but allege disability to try to obtain 
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Although SSA has been plagued with unwieldy backlogs at the 
hearings level, both AALJ and the SSA Inspector General have 
decried policies that encourage “paying down the backlog,” that is 
paying cases to get rid of them as quickly as possible.139 
AALJ, the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB),140 and many 
other groups have recommended that the procedures at SSA should 
be more formal.  At one time, managers at SSA might have agreed.  
In 1988, a draft proposal that would have provided rules of practice 
and limited some issues was disclosed in a New York Times article.141  
A hearing before the full House and Ways Committee was called.142  
The proposed rules would have “closed the record,” and would have 
limited the issues, at hearing and on appeal.  Evidence would have to 
be produced seven days prior to hearing.  Penalties for failing to 
supply evidence within the allotted time were also provided.  It 
provided pre-hearing conferences before staff attorneys, to limit 
issues, to gather evidence.  After the hearing, the proposed rules were 
never published. 
                                                 
“full” benefits.  The SSA trust fund exposure in these cases is usually 
quite limited.  On some occasions, such cases have been prioritized.  
Others types of cases assigned to judges include SSI eligibility, 
overpayment, underpayment claims and other matters involving 
inconsequential amounts, all of which should have reduced priority. 
 
139 Joint Hearing on Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog, 
Committee On Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of the Hon. 
Patrick O’Carroll, Inspector General, SSA). 
140 In 1994, when Congress passed legislation establishing the Social Security 
Administration as an independent agency, it also created a 7-member bipartisan 
Advisory Board to advise the President, the Congress, and the Commissioner of 
Social Security on Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 
policy.  Social Security Independence Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-296, 108 Stat.  
141 Steven V. Roberts, Sensitive Issues Put on the Shelf To Protect Bush, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/16/us/sensitive-
issues-put-on-the-shelf-to-protect-bush.html (“Today, it was learned that the 
Administration is preparing new rules that would restrict the rights of people to 
appeal Government decisions denying them Social Security or welfare benefits.”). 
142 Irvin Molotsky, Plan to Curb Benefit Appeals Is Rejected, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/04/us/plan-to-curb-
benefit-appeals-is-rejected.html (“The Commissioner, Dorcas R. Hardy, said in a 
statement that the draft of the proposal had ‘generated inaccurate information and 
caused undue alarm to the American public.’”).  
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After a four-year investigation, and obtaining the advice of 
experts like Professors Verkuil, Lubbers, and Frank Bloch,
143
 the 
Social Security Advisory Board found a serious gap between 
disability policy and the administrative capacity required to carry out 
that policy.  “There has not been a full-scale review of disability 
policy and process in over 20 years.  The result is a great deal of 
incoherence and at times demonstrable unfairness.”144 
To remedy this, the SSAB asked Congress to make a number of 
changes, including initiating an adversarial system, closing the record 
at hearing, and establishing rules of practice.  It also asked Congress 
to “rationalize” the role of the Appeals Council and to establish a 
“Social Security Court” to replace review at the United States District 
Courts.  Professors Verkuil and Lubbers appeared before Congress 
and specifically recommended closing the record.145   
Subsequently, on July 27, 2005, SSA published a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”), which included an attempt to close 
the record.  Also, SSA stated that with a high percentage of claimants 
represented by counsel at hearings, it recommended the use of an 
agency representative to balance the interests that would, in essence, 
modify the nature of the proceedings.  These rules were published, 
but due to pressure principally from the NOSSCR, but also 
Administrative Law Section of the ABA, some were also 
                                                 
143
 Paul Verkuil & Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review 
of Social Security Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory 
Board, STRATAGEM, INC. (Mar. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/VerkuilLubbers.pdf.  See also Paul R. 
Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social 
Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey 
S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a 
Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability 
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2003); Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, 
& Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security Administration’s New Disability 
Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising Reform, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 235 
(2007). 
144
 Hearing on Social Security Disability Program’s Challenges and 
Opportunities, H. Comm. On Ways and Means, (2001) (statement of Stanford G. 
Ross, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board). 
145 Second in a Series on Social Security Disability Programs’ Challenges and 
Opportunities: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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withdrawn.146 
There have been repeated suggestions that Congress should 
establish an independent adjudication agency with exclusive 
jurisdiction over SSA and CMS cases.147  Not only are the procedures 
unique, both agencies exclusively use rulemaking proceedings to set 
policy, rather than adjudication.  
Two independent adjudication agencies provide adjudication of 
safety and health disputes between the Department of Labor and 
employers: 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (OSHRC), 
 The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission (FMSHRC). 
OSHRC determines whether safety regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Labor have been violated.  FMSHRC adjudicates 
                                                 
146 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 
70 Fed. Reg. 43,590 (proposed July 27, 2005).  Under a Disability Service 
Improvement (DSI) process, a Quick Disability Determination (QDD) 
experimental process for certain types of claims was initiated where an initial 
finding of disability could be made within twenty days; the creation of a Medical 
and Vocational Expert System (MVES), designed to improve the quality and 
availability of medical and vocational expertise throughout the administrative 
process; the addition of a Federal Reviewing Official (FRO), who would review 
appealed initial decisions before such decisions are scheduled for an administrative 
hearing; and rules implementing the closing of the record were offered, but most 
were rejected.  See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial 
Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006).  In December 2009, SSA 
announced ending the DSI program.  In May, 2011, SSA issued a final rule.  
Eliminating the Decision Review Board Reestablishing Uniform National 
Disability Adjudication Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,802 (May 3, 2011). 
147  For example, the late Judge Robin J. Arzt suggested a new agency in Robin 
J. Arzt’s, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make 
the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267 (2003).  She also suggested creation of a 
“Social Security Court” to eliminate jurisdiction of the United States District 
Courts.  This was not the first time it had been suggested.  See Paul R. Verkuil & 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security 
Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, (2003) (proposing a Social Security 
Court); Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security?, 15 FLA. ST.  L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1987). 
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violations of mining standards likewise promulgated by the 
Department of Labor.148 
If SSA and CMS were to be placed in an adjudication agency, 
these agencies could act as models.  Meanwhile, it is ironic that 
although SSA and CMS were separated in 2003, they occupy 
separate offices in cities such as Cleveland, Miami, and Irvine.  It 
very well may be that if SSA and CMS hearings offices were 
consolidated, it might lead to substantial savings. 
It is also apparent that some agencies, such as the NLRB and the 
FLRA, have procedures and laws that may not be congruent, but 
which constitute variations on the same theme.  The same may be 
true of the ITC and FTC, and the DOT and the NTSB.  Claims heard 
under the Shipping Act by the FMC are not much different than some 
of the claims heard by my agency.  My agency hears whistleblower 
claims that may stem from alleged violations of laws and regulations 
of other agencies, such as the SEC, the EPA, DOT, and the NRC 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission).  Although these agencies, in 
theory, may participate in these proceedings, they rarely do.  
Therefore, perhaps Congress should consider several sets of mini-
corps. 
 
VII.  UNIFORMITY OF AGENCY PROCEDURES 
As stated above, some agencies believed that they were superior 
to the United States circuit courts, and established “acquiescence” 
policies.  In general, the degree of deference accorded to the 
interpretations that appellate courts review depends on whether the 
interpretation is offered by a district court or by an agency. 
The APA provides agency heads with broad discretion as to the 
scope of review of administrative law judge decisions.  “On appeal 
from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers 
                                                 
148  As Judge Arzt stated, two agencies formed as boards have primarily 
adjudicative duties:  
 The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and  
 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
However, these both have some powers beyond adjudication.  MSPB does 
studies of the civil service and recommends legislation to Congress and the 
President and the NTSB investigates accidents and recommends safety 
improvement measures.  
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which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may 
limit the issues on notice or by rule.”149  In practice, however, this 
free hand has been somewhat circumscribed by reviewing courts. 
Although the circuits are relatively clear in refusing to accord 
deference to the district courts upon review of their statutory 
interpretation decisions, the standard of review accorded agency 
decisions involving interpretation represents an area of debate, 
centered around the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to 
decisions of law by an agency.150  According to the Chevron standard 
of review, circuit courts ask: 
 
(1) Has Congress directly spoken on the precise issue decided by 
the agency; 
(2) If not, is the statute silent or ambiguous on the question (was 
the agency’s decision reasonable)?151 
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals used 
a “clearly erroneous” standard of review of patent office (“PTO”) 
cases, which generally governs appellate review of district court 
findings of fact, rather than the standards set forth in the APA, which 
permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by 
substantial evidence.152  Justice Breyer, writing for a majority that 
included Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, 
ruled that although the PTO relied on a statute that preceded the 
APA, a uniform approach is required unless a clear exception 
exists.153  
                                                 
149 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2006). 
150 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
151 Id. 
152 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999). 
153 Id.  The Federal Circuit determined that under APA § 559, the APA does  
 
not limit or repeal additional requirements . . . recognized by law.  
In the Circuit’s view: (1) at the time of the APA’s adoption, in 
1946, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a 
Federal Circuit predecessor, applied a court/court “clearly 
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No one has performed a thorough study of agency adjudication.  
From the standpoint of tracking cases, although this stage is 
relatively coherent in each agency, cross-agency comparisons are 
difficult due to the variety of review structures.  Moreover, even 
within an agency, because the review structure is normally quite 
separate from the hearings office, the logistics of following cases 
through both stages are problematic.  In fact, even within an agency, 
the standard of review may differ.  At my agency, cases may be 
appealed to two separate boards, the Administrative Review Board 
(ARB), and the Benefits Review Board (BRB).  Historically, the 
agency took the position that decisions to the ARB were not final; 
and therefore, the ARB was free to reweigh evidence.  The BRB was 
required to review cases using APA principles of review.154  Within 
some agencies, there are apparent turf wars that make evaluation 
difficult.155 
                                                 
erroneous” standard; (2) that standard was stricter than ordinary 
court/agency review standards; and (3) that special tradition of 
strict review consequently amounted to an “additional 
requirement” that under § 559 trumps the requirements imposed 
by § 706.  
 
Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This rationale was rejected.  
Professor Lubbers advises that he worked on the case, and  
 
the clearly erroneous standard used by the CCPA was an 
“additional requirement” that survived the enactment of the 
APA—was rejected.  It’s true that the CAFC’s decision based on 
§ 559 of the APA was reversed (we lost), but not because the 
argument itself was rejected—the Supreme Court simply found 
(wrongly I think) that the clearly erroneous test had not been 
consistently enough applied by the CCPA in the past to be an 
established requirement. 
 
Email from Jeffrey S. Lubbers to author (on file with author).  
154 This distinction has been blurred.  As on August 31, 2010, many of the 
cases that formerly were recommended or proposed to the ARB became “final” 
decisions. 
155 When the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) examined cases 
appealed under the Black Lung Benefits Act, and found a high incidence of 
remands from the BRB to OALJ, the DOL Office of Administrative Law Judges 
(OALJ). 
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Different docket personnel are often involved at each stage and 
the hearings offices usually lose track of cases after initial decisions 
are issued.156  It may be that a review of each agency will disclose 
that there are rules that should be added to the APA, or that can be 
added in rulemaking if a Conference or Corps were created.  The 
ABA Judicial Division, the National Judicial College, and the 
National Association of Administrative Law Judges attempted to 
initiate a study of adjudication, not only within the Federal 
government but also among the states.  However, funding was never 
accomplished and a thorough study remains unfulfilled. 
                                                 
Officials at DOL offered divergent opinions on why cases were 
remanded.  Some administrative law judges said claims are 
sometimes remanded to OWCP because medical evidence 
submitted by DOL’s approved doctors was incomplete and 
required clarification or further development.  BRB judges said 
claims are commonly remanded to OALJ for reconsideration 
because of certain legal deficiencies, such as errors in weighing 
evidence.  However, several administrative law judges said that 
they believed that BRB sometimes remands claims for further 
review by the administrative law judge to avoid the potential 
review of a BRB decision by a United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and others said that in their view, certain remands are 
the result of BRB reweighing evidence, which is beyond the 
narrow scope of BRB review.  In 2007, an independent program 
reviewer examined the number of OALJ remands to OWCP and 
concluded that further study of the causes of remands could help 
DOL identify policies and procedures that reduce this source of 
delays.  No study has been conducted to determine the causes of 
remands by any of DOL’s adjudicators back to the prior review 
stage, whether from adjudicatory bodies back to OWCP or from 
BRB to OALJ, according to DOL officials.  
 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-7, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
PROGRAM: ADMINISTRATIVE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGED COULD IMPROVE 
MINERS’ ABILITY TO PURSUE CLAIMS 16 (2009) [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
156 See The “Good Cause” Exemption from the APA Rulemaking 
Requirements (Recommendation No. 83-2) 1 C.F.R. § 305.83-2 (1992) [hereinafter 
Agency Structures].  Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within 
Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(1986). 
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In 2002, Professor Verkuil published a study of SSA court 
appeals.157  Whereas most appeals from the “regulatory” agencies are 
heard by the United States Circuit Courts, district court judges and 
magistrates hear SSA appeals.  Using “outcomes analysis,” he 
“expected” to find that courts applying the deferential substantial 
evidence standard would uphold 75-85% of SSA decisions denying 
benefits.158  He also expected the affirmation rate of decisions 
denying disability benefits to be higher than the affirmation rate of a 
class of agency decisions subject to de novo review.159  To the 
contrary, he found that courts upheld less than 50% of decisions that 
deny social security disability benefits and that courts reverse a much 
higher proportion of disability decisions than of agency decisions that 
are subject to de novo judicial review.160 
Other studies have rendered quite different “expectations.”  In a 
1999 study that included all stages of evaluation determined that the 
“first stage award rate” for new applications submitted to one of the 
54 state-based DDS is only 45.9%, whereas the “ultimate award rate” 
increases to 72.5%, allowing for the option to appeal or re-apply.161  
In some states, that percentage is now much higher.162 
Although the studies may be accurate, none relate to whether 
there are differences in rates on a geographic basis, or whether there 
                                                 
157 Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (2002). 
158 Id. at 690. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 719.  See also Testimony of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. Before the Social 
Security Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 112th Cong. 
(2012).  Pierce relies greatly on the fact that Verkuil expressed doubt that 
“Congress wants [judicial] scope of review to be an irrelevant labeling exercise,” 
but his findings demonstrate that it is “an irrelevant labeling exercise” in the 
context of judicial review of social security disability decisions.  District courts and 
circuit courts routinely pay lip service to the deferential substantial evidence 
standard while actually applying a standard more demanding even than de novo 
review.  Verkuil, supra note 157. 
161 Hugo Benitez-Silva et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security 
Disability Application, Appeal, and Award Process, 6 LABOUR ECONOMICS 147 
(1999). 
162 See Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
Disability Claims Allowance Rates, Initial and Reconsideration Adjudicative Level, 
Fiscal Year 2011, By Nation, Region, and State, 34 NOSSCR SOCIAL SECURITY 
FORUM 16 (July 2012) [hereinafter Statistics (NOSSCR Forum)]. 
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are other factors to generate variances in rates at the appellate level.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has evaluated 
populations by location and impairment, and these statistics are 
available, but they have not been considered by any of the studies.  In 
reviewing DDS state agency rates at the first and second levels of 
evaluation of SSA cases,163 there has not been any study that can 
reconcile that in some states a claimant has a 75% chance of 
receiving benefits at a stage below the hearings level, whereas in 
others a claimant has less than a 30% chance at that level.164  The 
high proportion of “reversals” by District and Circuit court judges, 
suggests that SSA should review its litigation policy, rather than 
suggest that the initial determinations require other “expectations.”165  
Unlike most other adjudication, the Social Security Act precludes 
settlement.166  In almost any other venue, the vast majority of claims 
are settled before a decision and order is published and is subject to 
appellate review.  Therefore, any analogy to pure adversarial appeals 
may not be valid. 
Much of the increase in the rate of “reversals” is, to a reasonable 
degree of probability, due to the fact that SSA claimants are 
“lawyered up.”  According to Social Security, by 1993, claimants 
requested a hearing in about 75% of all reconsideration denials.  The 
claimant typically retained an attorney for assistance in the appeal 
                                                 
163 The initial and reconsideration steps. 
164 See Statistics (NOSSCR Forum), supra note 162. 
165 Professor Lubbers advises me that the Verkuil study did compare SSA 
cases to “a class of cases subject to de novo review,” but I think it should be 
mentioned that those latter cases were FOIA decisions by agencies—where the 
government seems to get extra deference despite the statutory scope-of-review 
standard.  
166 Another exception was discussed in Ramey v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Program, 326 F.3d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 2003), where settlements in Black 
Lung cases were also barred.  Although the miner and the coal operator wanted to 
settle, the Court relied on a DOL interpretation of its own statute to reject 
settlement.  Id. at 476–78.  A subsequent GAO report suggested that DOL study the 
costs and benefits of allowing compensation for partial disability and settlement of 
claims.  See GAO Report, supra note 155.  In most Black Lung cases, both the 
miner and coal operator are usually represented.  Another factor may be that in 
many recent cases, the Black Lung Trust Fund has paid interim benefits to the 
miner. 
    
106          Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary    33-1 
 
process.167  Apparently, since then, representation has increased.  It is 
reasonable to expect that good representation should skew the 
expectations.168  
There is also no mention in the studies that the case law among 
the circuits may vary.  If that is important, as stated above, in 1983, 
primarily as a remedy for “non-acquiescence,” Senate Bill 1275 
included language that would have provided for all administrative 
appeals to be heard by one Circuit Court.169  It has yet to be studied 
whether or not this would result in cost savings. 
It is also apparent that these studies have not considered the 
history of appeals in agencies other than SSA.  When ACUS 
evaluated the SSA Appeals Council, it determined that it “added 
nothing of value” to the process.170  Professor Lubbers and the late 
Judge Robin Arzt have made suggestions for replacement by a 
Review Board.171  It may very well be that SSA has more to learn 
from other agencies’ experiences.  Professor Lubbers and the late 
Judge Arzt suggested that all hearings should be reviewed by a single 
body, similar to the Social Security court.  Such an idea could lead to 
cost savings through consolidation and elimination of duplication 
                                                 
167 Benitez-Silva et al., supra note 161, at 163–64. 
168 I had the opportunity to hear hundreds of these cases in several states.  I 
would testify that the quality of representation varies, and if a claimant is able to 
find the right lawyer, as the claimant controls the presentation of evidence in a non-
adversarial setting, chances of losing are low.  I also would testify that at least two 
of my former colleagues denied almost every claim, but were reversed on appeal 
every time.  Many of these cases were remanded, and I heard many of the remands.  
169 Administrative Law Judge Corps Act, S. 1275, 98th Cong. (1983). 
170 Agency Structures, supra note 156. 
171 Robin J. Arzt, Proposal for a United States Social Security Court 6 (2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/annual2006/Tab8Bproposal.pdf; Frank Bloch et 
al., Introducing Nonadversarial Government Representatives to Improve the 
Record for Decision in Social Security Disability Adjudications: A Report to the 
Social Security Advisory Board (2002), available at 
http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil.pdf; Paul Verkuil & 
Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security 
Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board, STRATAGEM, 
INC. (Mar. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/VerkuilLubbers.pdf. 
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among agencies and result in judicial economy, while promoting 
uniformity.  At least one state has established such a court.172 
It could also be that in the name of uniformity and fundamental 
fairness, Congress should include non-APA agencies.  A 1992 study 
by former Administrative Law Judge John H. Frye III (based on 1989 
data) identified about eighty-three case-types (involving about 
343,000 cases annually) of non-APA adjudication.  Frye identified 
2,692 Presiding Officers in the federal service.  Of the eighty-three 
case-types, fifteen accounted for 98% of the total.  
By far, the greatest number of non-APA adjudications involves 
immigration deportation cases, where an Immigration Judge (IJ) 
“shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or 
deportability of an alien.”  In context, it is clear that the IJ is to 
conduct an evidentiary proceeding.  For example, an alien “shall have 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence and cross examine 
witnesses presented by the government.”  The IJ is authorized to 
administer oaths, receive evidence, and issue subpoenas; the IJ must 
rule on evidentiary objections and provide findings and reasons for 
decisions.173  In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), 
the Supreme Court determined that the APA governed the enabling 
statute.  However, Congress subsequently removed this requirement.  
There are dozens of Circuit Court decisions, which state that Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions should follow the APA 
formula.174  The ABA issued a report in February 2010, Reforming 
                                                 
172 The Commonwealth Court is one of Pennsylvania’s two statewide 
intermediate appellate courts and is unlike any other state court in the nation.  
Article V, section 4 of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution created the 
Commonwealth Court.  It was established in 1970. 
173 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(1)(a)(1), (b)(1), (4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 240.1(c).   
174 Noting the high reversal rates of the BIA in the Courts of Appeals, Judge 
Richard Posner wrote: 
 
This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is 
not due to judicial hostility to the nation’s immigration policies 
or to a misconception of the proper standard of judicial review of 
administrative decisions.  It is due to the fact that the adjudication 
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.  Whether this is due to 
resource constraints or to other circumstances beyond the Board's 
and the Immigration Court’s control, we do not know, though we 
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the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, 
Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of 
Removal Cases, approved as ABA policy.  While it did not 
recommend that IJ hearings should be APA hearings, or that IJs be 
selected using the OPM register, it recommended that the BIA and 
IJs be removed from the Department of Justice and that a Title I 
Immigration Court be established.175  At its June 2012 Plenary 
Session, ACUS approved a recommendation to streamline federal 
immigration courts but did not accept the ABA suggestions.176  
                                                 
note that the problem is not of recent origin.  All that is clear is 
that it cannot be in the interest of the immigration authorities, the 
taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or citizens concerned with the 
effective enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws for 
removal orders to be routinely nullified by the courts, and that the 
power of correction lies in the Department of Homeland Security, 
which prosecutes removal cases, and the Department of Justice, 
which adjudicates them in its Immigration Court and Board of 
Immigration Appeals . . . . And anyway punishment was not the 
rationale of the Board’s action, which appears to have been 
completely arbitrary.  The order of removal is vacated . . . . 
 
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).  Many other Circuit Court opinions express similar views. 
175 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION 114B, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/midyear/su
mmary_of_recommendations/114B.authcheckdam.doc.  See also Dana Leigh 
Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 1, 14 n.71 (2008); 
Arnold & Porter, LLP, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote 
Independence, Fairness Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of 
Removal Cases, ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION (2010). 
176 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, IMMIGRATION 
REMOVAL ADJUDICATION: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION (June 14-15, 2012), 
available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Proposed-
Immigration-Rem.-Adj.-Recommendation-for-Plenary-5-22-12.pdf.  See also Lenni 
B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Taking Steps to Enhance Quality and Timeliness 
in Immigration Removal Adjudication, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Jan. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ACUS-Immigration-Removal-
Adjudication-Draft-Report-1_12_12.pdf.  Professor Lubbers states that from the 
beginning, ACUS excluded these “major structural issues” from its scope.  
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Moreover, the Justice Department hired IJs on a political basis,177 
and after litigation, suspended all hiring of BIA members and IJs in 
January 2007.178  DOJ has settled with rejected applicants who were 
apparently better qualified than some of those hired who apparently 
remain IJs.  It has a new selection method, but the public and the 
American bar have no input.179  Although it was suggested180 that the 
Justice Department use the OPM register or hire from the existing 
register, or create an internal register based on merit selection, to try 
to avoid the appearance of political favoritism and agency bias, 
neither the ABA Commission nor ACUS recommended it. 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) currently has one ALJ, who adjudicates 
                                                 
177 An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling 
and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, Evidence and Analysis: 
Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals Member Hiring Decisions, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE (June 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter “IG Report”]; see 
also Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based On 
GOP Ties, THE WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html. 
178 IG Report, supra note 177.  The Justice Department official was 
reprimanded by the Virginia bar for politicizing the Justice Department's hiring and 
promotion process.  Ryan J. Reilly, Monica Goodling Reprimanded By Virginia 
State Bar, TPMMUCKRACKER (May 6, 2011), 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/monica_goodling.php. 
179 Under the new process, EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge 
(OCIJ) reviews applications and rates each candidate.  Three-member EOIR panels 
of two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges or Assistant Chief Immigration Judges 
and a senior EOIR manager also perform a review.  Selectees are reviewed by the 
EOIR Director (or his designee) and the Chief Immigration Judge, who together 
select at least three candidates for a vacancy to recommend for final consideration.  
A second three-member panel, comprised of the EOIR Director (or his designee), a 
career SES employee designated by the Deputy Attorney General, and a non-career 
member of the SES designated by the Deputy Attorney General, then conduct 
interviews.  This panel recommends one candidate for the Deputy Attorney General 
to recommend to the Attorney General for final approval.  Both the Deputy 
Attorney General and the Attorney General can request additional candidates if 
they do not approve the candidates forwarded to them.  IG Report, supra note 177. 
180 Mainly by FALJC and NCALJ. 
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(1) employer sanctions cases,181 (2) unfair immigration-related 
employment practices,182 and (3) document fraud.183  At times, she 
has been asked to sit on the BIA and sometimes has been loaned to 
other agencies.  Wherever and whenever she sits, the APA applies to 
the proceeding. 
At DOL, administrative law judges comprise the Board of Alien 
Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) under the Immigration & 
Nationality Act (INA), which hears claims for permanent 
certification and most of the decisions are en banc.  Individual judges 
hear H-1B visa cases and other temporary INA visa cases.  The 
Department of State issues the visas.  
The Contract Disputes Act provides that a board of contract 
appeals shall “provide to the fullest extent practicable informal, 
expeditious, and inexpensive resolution of disputes and shall issue 
decisions in writing.”184  A member may administer oaths, authorize 
depositions, and subpoena witnesses for taking of testimony.  Again, 
the context makes clear that an evidentiary hearing is intended.185  At 
                                                 
181 Employer sanctions cases are brought by the Department of Homeland 
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) when the agency issues a 
Notice of Intent to Fine to the employer, and the employer requests a hearing.  If 
liability is found, the ALJ can impose monetary sanctions, issue a cease and desist 
order, and award attorney’s fees.  See 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012); Daniel F. 
Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 476 (2011); Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Releases FY 2010 Statistical Year Book, Book Includes Pending Caseload Numbers 
for the Immigration Courts, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/2010SYB02012011.htm (last visited May 
18, 2013). 
182 These cases are usually initiated when an individual files a charge with the 
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices 
(OSC), within the Civil Rights Division.  The OSC investigates the charge, and 
then determines whether or not to file a complaint with OCAHO on behalf of the 
charging party.  If the OSC does not file a complaint, the charging party may file an 
individual complaint with OCAHO.  If liability is found, the ALJ can award back 
pay, order hiring or reinstatement, and civil penalties where OSC is the 
complainant.  See citations accompanying note 181. 
183 This provision establishes civil penalties for document fraud that relates to 
satisfying an immigration law requirement or obtaining and immigration-related 
benefits.  Document fraud cases are brought and adjudicated much like employer 
sanctions cases.  See citations accompanying note 181. 
184 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012).  
185 41 U.S.C. §§ 607(e), 610 (2012). 
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one time, three of my colleagues, administrative law judges, also 
constituted the DOL Board of Contract Appeals (BCA).  Although 
these may not be APA hearings, once an administrative law judge is 
assigned to hear them, they become so. 
The same is true at the MSPB.  None of the assigned judges are 
administrative law judges.  However, when an administrative law 
judge is borrowed by the agency, the proceedings are APA hearings. 
  Although the Veterans’ Administration (VA) holds hearings, the 
APA does not govern them.186  Boards of Veterans Appeal (BVA) 
hearings are informal and non-adversarial.187  Members of the Board 
review benefit claims determinations made by local VA offices and 
issue decisions on appeals.  These “law judges,” attorneys 
experienced in veterans’ law and in reviewing benefit claims, are the 
only ones who can issue Board decisions.188  Staff attorneys, also 
trained in veterans’ law, review the facts of each appeal and assist the 
Board members.189  Persons claiming VA benefits are not generally 
represented by lawyers, and the government is not represented at all.  
There have been some suggestions that the process should use 
aspects of the APA, especially the substantial evidence test.190  In 
2003, the ABA recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
select members of the BVA through procedures supposedly modeled 
on those used for the selection of administrative law judges and 
board of contract appeals judges.191 
The ABA also urges that non-APA employment discrimination 
hearings conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
                                                 
186 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(a), 7107(b) (2012). 
187 See 38 C.F.R. §20.700(c) (2011). 
188 The judges are not ALJs. 
189 38 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104 (2012). 
190 See Ronald L. Smith, VA Implementation of the Informal and Non-
Adversarial Claims Adjudication System May Not Be Serving Veterans Well, (Nov. 
1, 2001) (presented at the Fall Meeting of the Section of Administrative Law and 
Regulatory Practice, Washington, D.C.).  I served in a panel discussion with Mr. 
Smith as moderator to discuss the ramifications of applying the APA to VA 
hearings.  The bar and some appellate judges present universally favored adoption 
of the APA.  Id.  The opposition came mostly from BVA judges who advised that 
if the substantial evidence test supplanted the clear and convincing test now in 
force, they would have to write lengthy time-consuming decisions.  Id. 
191 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 102 
(Aug. 11–12, 2003). 
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Commission (EEOC) become subject to the APA.192  EEOC hearings 
determine the rights of federal employees, applicants for 
employment, and former employees under the various non-
discrimination statutes which EEOC also enforces in the private 
sector, including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 
1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq.; and the Americans 
with Disabilities Amendment Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.  Since 
adoption of the ABA policy, the EEOC has been negotiating to 
voluntarily adopt the APA. 
Although the interests of the agencies have been the paramount 
factor in determining whether the hearings should follow the APA, 
the main factors should be whether the hearings are fair and whether 
this is communicated to the public. 
Considering the potential of added agencies that may be included 
as noted above, it very well may be that if procedures were 
consolidated, it might lead to greater judicial economy and also to 
substantial potential savings far beyond the $20 million contemplated 
by Congress when the Corps Bill was under consideration. 
 
VIII.  INDIVIDUAL DUE PROCESS V. “OUTCOMES ANALYSIS”   
Under our Constitution, litigants are supposed to have a right to 
present their claims, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
have a fair opportunity to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.  “No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law.”193  When a party becomes the target of an 
individualized governmental decision, that party should have a right 
                                                 
192 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 124 
(Aug. 8–9, 2011).  Although this resolution passed virtually unanimously at the 
House of Delegates, there was some opposition from the Administrative Law 
Section. 
193 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses 
the same words, called the “Due Process Clause,” to describe a legal obligation of 
all states.  Although the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only in 
criminal cases, case law and the APA extend it.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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to an individualized determination.194  Most agency hearings are 
modeled after the common law system contemplated in the right to a 
fair trial under the Fifth Amendment.  The hearings are similar to 
bench trials before United States District Courts.195  
The exceptions are at SSA and CMS, where the form of hearing 
is “non-adversarial,” as the claimant seeking benefits may be 
represented, but the agency is not.  Critics to this process assume 
certain facts, sometimes using outcomes analysis, to determine that 
the result should be determinative of the process.  Relying on an oft 
cited SSA case, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), critics 
of individual due process rely on a majority statement that SSA 
hearings do not require the same level of due process protections 
under the Fourteenth Amendment as in other administrative law 
cases.196  In another Social Security case, Mathews v. Eldridge,197 
parties protected by the due process clause are entitled to “some form 
of hearing.”198  The Mathews Court determined that a hearing is not 
required prior to the termination of Social Security disability 
payments, and the administrative procedures prescribed under the 
Act fully comport with due process.  Critics argue that the elements 
of that hearing are not defined, and depend on the circumstances of 
the particular program at issue.  There was no mention of the APA in 
Mathews; and in Perales, the court specifically stated that it did not 
consider the APA.  However, after Perales and Mathews, Congress 
ended any confusion regarding the applicability of the APA to the 
Social Security Act by enacting “[a]n Act to amend the Social 
Security Act to expedite the holding of hearings under titles II, XVI 
                                                 
194 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).  
195 Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 
743 (2002); Rhode Island Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st 
Cir. 2002). 
196 Specifically, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), when the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing before a recipient of 
certain government benefits (such as welfare) can be deprived of such benefits.  Id. 
at 261.  The individual losing benefits is not entitled to a trial, but is entitled to an 
oral hearing before an impartial decision-maker, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to a written opinion setting out the evidence relied 
upon and the legal basis for the decision.  Id. at 268–70.   
197 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
198 Id. at 333. 
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and XVIII by establishing uniform review procedures, and for other 
purposes.”199  Under this and later statutes, SSA hearings are APA 
hearings.200 
In a more recent case, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. 
Whitman,201 although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
provided a “hearing” before its Environmental Appeals Board 
(EAB), comprised of non-ALJs, the
 
11th Circuit found it did not meet 
APA hearing requirements.202 
Moreover, the APA dictates differences in evaluation among 
agency adjudicators.  For example, a Social Security ALJ’s factual 
determination is entitled to deference, while a factual determination 
by the Social Security Appeals Council is not.203  
After noting the unique process, and after determining that the 
outcomes are unfair, the following suggestions have been offered for 
SSA hearings: 
 
                                                 
199 Pub L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135–37 (1976).  The House Reports of the bill 
states:  
 
To avoid any possible misinterpretation, the bill specifically 
provides that the temporary hearing officers authorized to 
conduct hearings under the bill would be subject to all the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that assure 
independence from agency control . . . . However, the specific 
application of these provisions of the APA, together with the 
provisions of the bill applying the same procedural safeguards to 
review proceedings under title XVI as apply under title II, should 
eliminate the possibility of the courts determining that SSI 
review procedures do not comply with the Administrative 
Procedure Act or due process. 
 
Id.  Similar language is in the Senate Report. 
200 Id.  See also Conversion of Temporary Administrative Law Judges, H.R. 
Rep. No. 617, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977); UNITED STATES CONGRESS HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, CONVERSION OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES: REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 5723 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 
1977).  
201 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004). 
202 Professor Lubbers argues that there’s no indication that EPA could have 
satisfied the court if it had used ALJs instead.  Email from Jeffrey S. Lubbers to 
author (on file with author).  
203 Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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1. Use of rulemaking by SSA to reduce the number 
of issues that must be heard at hearing.204 
 
Professor Lubbers argues that there might be other general factual 
issues that could be resolved as fairly and more efficiently through 
rulemaking as through case-by-case adjudication.205 
 
2. Modifying the role of the Appeals Council. 
 
Professor Lubbers suggests replacement of the SSA Appeals 
Council with a Decision Review Board for the Appeals Council, with 
power to review both allowances and denials.206 
 
3. Consider establishment of a Social Security Court. 
 
Professor Lubbers cites to increases in the numbers of appeals 
and a lack of uniformity among the district court decisions.207  He 
cites to a study that showed “a wide range of outright allowances (not 
including the numerous remands) among the 48 district courts that 
had over 100 appeals, with a high of about 28% and a low of 
zero.”208 
 
4. Introduce government attorneys/adversarial hearings. 
 
Professor Lubbers notes that the non-adversarial system makes a 
judge’s job more difficult, and asks that “counselors,” not 
prosecutors, should be used, as “[he is] not convinced that the 
benefits of transforming the program from an inquisitorial to an 
                                                 
204 See Testimony of Jeffrey S. Lubbers: Before the Social Security 
Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 112th Cong. (June 27, 
2012), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lubbers_testimony.pdf [hereinafter 
Testimony of Lubbers]. 
205 Id.  
206 This process was tried on an experimental basis in one geographic region 
but was abandoned.  
207 Testimony of Lubbers, supra note 204, at 9–10. 
208 Id. at 15. 
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adversary program would outweigh the considerable costs of doing 
so.”209 
On July 22, 2010 the CBO issued “Social Security Disability 
Insurance: Participation Trends and Their Fiscal Implications,”210 and 
on July 16, 2012 issued “Policy Options for the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program.”211  CBO evaluated how SSA hires 
and trains “employees” who conduct disability application hearings.  
It discussed SSA representation at hearings, “which in the short term 
would add certain costs for hiring and training but might over the 
long run result in lower spending for the program because fewer 
people would be admitted.”212 
If the government were represented, ABA policy would require 
the agency to provide free representation to pro se claimants under 
the ABA Model Access Act.213 
 
5. Eliminate the right to a hearing before an administrative law 
judge. 
 
Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., argues214 that the decisions of the 
state agencies at SSA are more accurate than those of the judges.215  
                                                 
209 Id. at 16.  
210 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE: 
PARTICIPATION TRENDS AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET 
ISSUE BRIEF (July 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11673/07-22-
ssdisabilityins_brief.pdf. 
211 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM (July 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43421-
DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf. 
212 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 15 (July 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43421-
DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf. 
213 ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_de
fendants/ls_sclaid_104_revised_final_aug_2010.authcheckdam.pdf.  
214 Richard J. Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative Law Judge 
Disability Decisionmaking? CATO: REGULATION (2011), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n3-
3.pdf.  
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He relies in large part on the assumption that the decisions rendered 
by judges are inaccurate.216  Pierce also references Justice Antonin 
Scalia, “The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise,”217 who argued that judges 
impose the “highest” salaries and occupy a high proportion (24% to 
73%) of the Senior Executive Service in each agency.218  
In some agencies, because of “performance awards” and the right 
to overtime pay, some administrative law judges make less than the 
staff.219  Also, administrative law judges are not part of the Senior 
Executive Service.  Professor Pierce argues that billions of dollars 
could be saved in that manner.220 
Over time, a number of suggestions would have included other 
agencies.  Agencies continue to have an irresistible impulse to 
appoint their own judges without regard to claims of favoritism and 
bias.  There were attempts to appoint non-APA judges to hear cases 
currently heard by APA judges at the International Trade 
Commission.  There have been attempts to curtail APA procedures at 
the Small Business Administration, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), the Energy Department (FERC), and the 
                                                 
215 He also accuses USDC judges of failing to follow the law:  
 
District judges should be instructed to review SSA 
decisions as final decisions based solely on the record 
created at the agency.  At present, district judges are 
required to permit applicants who appeal a decision 
denying benefits to obtain a remand to SSA to allow the 
applicant to introduce new evidence.  That is not the way 
other agency review proceedings are conducted.  The 
norm in other contexts is judicial review based solely on 
the record before the agency.  
 
Id. at 40.  In many contexts, this is certainly not the case. 
216 Id. at 36. 
217 Justice Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 
(1979). 
218 Id.  
219 This is especially true at agencies such as the SEC where the staff is entitled 
to enrichment pay, while administrative law judges receive pay under the AL 
schedule.  In an anomaly, some law clerks may be able to make more than their 
employing judges.  
220 See Pierce, supra note 214, at 36. 
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Department of Education; and, at present, there is a bill in Congress 
to abolish the EPA and, with it, its hearing program.221  
 
6. Demote or remove administrative law judges.222 
 
Professor Pierce argues that Social Security judges are 
“unconstitutional,” referencing Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Board (PCAOB), 130 U.S. 3138 (2010).  
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, 
requires that the president, and no one else, pick the principal Federal 
officers (with Senate approval), while permitting “heads of 
departments” to pick “inferior officers,”223 who are supervised and 
directed by “principal officers.”  PCAOB members are not picked by 
the president, but by the SEC commissioners as a group.  By striking 
the restrictions on removing PCAOB members, and thus making 
them subject to termination at will by the SEC, the Court was able to 
render PCAOB members inferior officers who could be validly 
picked by someone other than the president under the Appointments 
Clause.  
                                                 
221 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity 
Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65 (1996).  He argued then and maintains now 
that agencies are “vot[ing] with their feet” because of the problems with the ALJ 
program.  Id. at 72.  If that was true then, it was because of politics.  I find that 
when the economies of scale and the danger of public anger due to perceived 
injustices are factored, due process under the APA is a bargain.    
222  He would require employers to share the cost of disability decisions; 
require SSA review of past decisions to grant benefits; implement SSA quality 
controls on judges; and eliminate nonexertional restrictions as a potential disability. 
223 
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of 
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments. 
 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
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Thus, Professor Pierce, by analogy, states that in order to be 
“inferior,” one must be subservient, and finds that SSA judges are 
actually “principal,” rather than “inferior” officers, since they are 
unaccountable to the agency for their decisions.224 
Further, he cites to Landry v. FDIC225 to argue that as the SSA 
decisions are “final,” they are “officers of the United States” rather 
than employees, who would render only recommended decisions as 
the FDIC administrative law judge was required to do.226  He argues 
that SSA’s rules allow an appeal of an SSA judge’s decision to a 
higher authority in the agency “only at the behest of an applicant 
whose application for benefits has been denied by an ALJ.”227  ALJ 
decisions that grant benefits are final.228  They are not reviewable by 
any institution of government.229  Thus, it is clear that SSA ALJs are 
“officers” as that term is used in the constitution. 
However, SSA has had “own motion” review of selected 
decisions for many years.230  Therefore, the predicate to the 
                                                 
224 Professor Lubbers states that the discussion of the constitutionality of for-
cause protection for ALJs appointed by agency officials who also have for-cause 
protection after the PCAOB case should also discuss Intercollegiate Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  It finds, 
among other things, that the “for cause” removal provision protecting the Board 
judges is unconstitutional because it contributes to making them principal officers 
that would (if the provision were not severed) make the judges’ appointment 
violative of the Appointments Clause.  Id.  
However, those judges were not APA judges with section 11 protections.  I 
also note that the agency, the Library of Congress, capitulated to pressure and 
acquiesced.  Under the APA, OPM would, I argue, have an affirmative, statutory 
duty to intercede on behalf of the judges.  
225 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
226 Pierce, supra note 214, at 40. 
227 Id.  
228 Id. 
229 Id.  
230 Section 304(g) of Public Law 96-265, enacted June 9, 1980, states that: 
“The Secretary . . . shall implement a program of reviewing, on his own motion, 
decisions rendered by administrative law judges as a result of hearings under 
section 221(d) of the Social Security Act . . . .”  For Example, see SSR 82-13: 
“OHA [now ODAR] will conduct a comprehensive, ongoing program under which 
a prescribed percentage of administrative law judge decisions involving the issue of 
disability, particularly those allowing previously denied claims for disability 
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argument, that “[award decisions] are not reviewable by any 
institution of government,” is not accurate.231  If Landry is supposed 
to apply to every other agency besides the FDIC, it did not 
contemplate that an agency may delegate any powers it may have to 
an “inferior” officer, or recognize that Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution does not expressly limit delegation of agency authority. 
Moreover, although decisions may be “final,” they may be 
reviewable.  For example, almost all of the decisions I render at the 
Department of Labor involve several parties.  Whereas at one time, in 
some categories of cases we rendered only recommended decisions, 
and some of those were automatically reviewed, by August 31, 2010, 
our rules were changed to convert most of the former recommended 
decisions to “final” decisions.  The parties, including my agency, are 
free to appeal. 
 
7. Recently, Samuel Johnson, the Chair of the Subcommittee on 
Social Security, House Ways and Means Committee, inquired 
whether it would be possible to replace the SSA judges. 
 
This has been considered intermittently since state disability was 
acquired by Social Security in 1973.  Former chairmen of the 
Subcommittee, such as James Bunning, advocated permitting the 
state agency DDS determination to be the “final” determination.  
Professor Lubbers wrote about it in “APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest 
for Uniformity Faltering?,”232 regarding use of non-APA judges.  
                                                 
benefits, will be evaluated prior to their effectuation, even though there is no 
request for review.” 
231 Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security Disability 
Claimants (and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
SOCIETY (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-
briefs/scapegoating-social-security-disability-claimants-and-the-judges-who-evalu.  
They find that Professor Pierce misinterprets the problem with the system and find 
that his proposed solutions are misguided.  
Whereas Pierce asserts that the “increase in the proportion of the population 
that has been determined to be permanently disabled is attributable to ALJ 
decisions,” they note that administrative law judge decisions amount to a relatively 
small portion of disability awards, as the DDS perform 75% of total annual awards.  
Id.  But they also do not address that there is no uniformity to the DDS 
determinations. 
232 Lubbers, supra note 221. 
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When the SSI program was created, although the judges who heard 
SSI cases were employees of SSA, they were not APA judges, 
although their colleagues who heard SSA disability insurance 
benefits cases were.233 
In 2005, the ABA suggested the opposite, that Congress should 
extend due process rights beyond traditional APA cases.234  It 
categorized the APA cases as “Type A” adjudication.235  In the report 
to the ABA House of Delegates, the Administrative Law Section 
noted that numerous statutes that call for evidentiary hearings as part 
of regulatory or benefit programs are not governed by the APA’s 
adjudication provisions.236  These were termed, “Type B” 
adjudications.237  Although the following are not contained in the 
actual recommendation, they include: 
 
1. Extend certain APA procedural protections to Type B 
adjudication.  
2.  Require adoption of ethical standards for ALJs and POs 
(presiding officers in non-APA hearings) and protect full-time 
POs against removal or discipline without cause.  
3. Clarify the definitions of rule and adjudication under the APA.  
4. Clarify the circumstances in which newly adopted adjudication 
schemes will be Type A as opposed to Type B adjudication. 
5. Clarify the APA provisions relating to evidence. 
6. Clarify the ability of all adjudicating agencies to issue declaratory 
orders. 
7.  Clarify the right to obtain transcripts at agency’s cost of 
duplication.  
                                                 
233 See Lubbers, supra note 221, regarding use of non-APA judges. 
234 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Report and Recommendation Number 114 
(2005). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
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8. Clarify that legislation adopted pursuant to these 
recommendations will supersede existing contrary statutory 
provisions.238  
In 2000, the ABA determined that Congress should prefer APA 
adjudication over other forms, and recommended that it create a 
default provision:239 If Congress failed to include language 
concerning application of the APA to a statute, it would be presumed 
that the APA should control.240  Although Congress has not enacted 
these provisions, they remain ABA policy and remain broader ideas 
about uniformity than any of the suggestions set forth above.  
As of this writing, neither the Commissioner of Social Security or 
OPM has responded to Chairman Johnson.  However, it is clear that 
the APA must be applied uniformly except where Congress has 
expressly stated otherwise.241  So far, neither Professor Pierce nor 
anyone else has directed the Chairman to an express, or even an 
implied, statement in the Social Security Act that would preclude 
application of the Act. 
 
IX.  FINDINGS OF FACT 
Upon review, I find that Congress, nor anyone else, has 
performed an extensive review of APA adjudication.  Therefore, 
most of the “outcomes” assumptions about APA adjudication are 
mere folklore.  Although it is probably true that adversarial hearing 
decisions are more valid than inquisitional hearings, no data has been 
produced to verify this fact. 
I also find that the “cost” of having an unbiased adjudicator 
cannot be measured in purely economic terms.242  If decisions are 
continually considered to be unfair, the reputation of every agency 
and the entire government may be jeopardized.  Therefore, the public 
interest must be factored into any consideration.  Moreover, 
                                                 
238 Id.  
239 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 234. 
240 Id. 
241 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
242 “Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole 
constitutional system.”  Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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uniformity may bring judicial and economic economies, which might 
make due process a bargain.243  
Although the functions of administrative law judges are clearly 
judicial, not “executive,” OPM and the employing agencies consider 
ALJs as “mere” employees.  In fact, when representatives of the 
administrative law judge organizations met with the current OPM 
Director for the first time, he stated that administrative law judges 
were “judicial” and that judicial rules should apply.  In the ensuing 
three years since the Director made that statement, however, OPM 
has not changed its position.244  Section 11 of the APA and Nash v. 
Califano provide otherwise. 
It is not clear whether the investigators of the studies about SSA 
are aware that decision making has been “dumbed down,” first by use 
of the “sequential evaluation,” which requires a judge to make certain 
findings,245 and also by the listings of impairments,246 which if met, 
                                                 
243 In 1989, the CBO determined that conservatively, a Corps Bill could save 
$20 million per year.  In 2012, that amount would yield approximately $140 
million. 
244 See Mahoney v. Donovan, 824 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011).  The court 
dismissed the suit, holding that: (1) ALJ failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies with respect to retaliation claim under Rehabilitation Act; (2) ALJ did not 
suffer materially adverse employment action; (3) ALJ was not subjected to hostile 
work environment; and (4) ALJ lacked standing to bring APA claims.  Id.  
Mahoney, the Chief ALJ at HUD, alleges that, among other things, that HUD 
officials selectively assigned cases based on political considerations and failed to 
provide adequate resources for legal research.  Although he asked OPM to review 
his allegations, they failed to protect his judicial independence, stating that as a 
mere employee, he had a duty to follow orders, even if they were unreasonable and 
violated the APA.  Id.   
245 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and § 416.920: 
 
The five-step sequential evaluation process.  The sequential evaluation 
process is a series of five “steps” that we follow in a set order.  If we 
can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our 
determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step.  If we 
cannot find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to 
the next step.  Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your 
residual functional capacity.  (See paragraph (e) of this section).  We 
use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and 
step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.  These are the five 
steps we follow: 
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provide an automatic award without further development by the 
administrative law judge.  A judge is not free to award benefits 
without addressing the sequential evaluation.  I assume most of the 
appellate decisions that reversed the SSA denial decisions are 
rendered because “substantial evidence” does not address certain 
shifting of the burdens of proof from the claimant to the 
government;247 and, as the government was not represented at the 
                                                 
(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any.  If you 
are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not 
disabled.  
(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your 
impairment(s).  If you do not have a severe medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 
404.1509, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the 
duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.  
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your 
impairment(s).  If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one 
of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration 
requirement, we will find that you are disabled.  
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual 
functional capacity and your past relevant work.  If you can still do 
your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled.  
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your 
residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work 
experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work.  If you 
can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not 
disabled.  If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find 
that you are disabled.  
246 The Listing of Impairments describes, for each major body system, 
impairments considered severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any 
gainful activity (or in the case of children under age 18 applying for SSI, severe 
enough to cause marked and severe functional limitations).  Most of the listed 
impairments are permanent or expected to result in death, or the listing includes a 
specific statement of duration is made.  For all other listings, the evidence must 
show that the impairment has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of 
at least 12 months.  The criteria in the Listing of Impairments are applicable to 
evaluation of claims for disability benefits under the Social Security disability 
insurance program or payments under both the SSI program.  20 C.F.R pt. 404, 
subpt. P, app. 1.  
247 For example, in adult disability hearings, once it is determined that a 
claimant who has a medically determinable impairment cannot return to former 
work, the burden shifts to SSA to prove that there are jobs that exist in the national 
economy that the claimant can perform.  See step (v), supra note 245. 
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hearing and the claimants were, the burden has not been met.248  
Moreover, at SSA, the judge has the duty to develop the record to 
benefit the claimant.249  This is no mean trick.250  
Moreover, the professors rely in large part on Professor Verkuil’s 
“outcomes analysis” methodology of investigating the data attributed 
to court review.  If the data is accurate, why not apply regression 
analysis (and, if so, what type of regression), analysis of variance, 
structural equation modeling, survival analysis, or some other 
technique?  There also is no mention of the fact that the Social 
Security Act, unlike most other statutes, is a “humanitarian” statute 
that is claimant friendly, and is interpreted accordingly.251 
                                                 
248 In writing this paper, I asked SSA statisticians whether they could 
determine at which step of the sequential evaluation an award or denial is made.  
Apparently, they cannot.  It would be interesting to determine what percentage of 
claims are denied because a claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activities at 
step one, or what percentage of claims are denied because no medically 
determinable impairment was proven at step two, etc.  Although SSA judges hear 
claims “de novo,” it would be interesting to enquire whether appeals can be limited 
only to jurisdiction and/or standing before a presentation of further evidence can be 
proffered. 
249 Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2001); Haley v. Massanari, 258 
F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2000). 
250 Although Perales is often cited for the proposition that ALJs wear three 
hats, the Court decision actually states: 
 
[We are not persuaded] by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat 
suggestion.  It assumes too much and would bring down too 
many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental 
structure of great and growing complexity.  The Hearing 
Examiner [ALJ] . . . does not act as counsel.  He acts as an 
examiner charged with developing the facts.   
 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).  The decision was six to three; 
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion.  Id. 
251  E.g., the Social Security Act is a remedial statute which must be liberally 
construed in favor of disability if a disability is proven.  See Combs v. Gardner, 382 
F.2d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1967); Polly v. Gardner, 364 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1966).  
“[S]ince the Act is remedial in nature, it should be given a liberal construction in 
order to effectuate its purpose.”  SSR 71-30: Sections 413(a), 413(b), and 422(d), 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969; Sections 223(a), 223(b), and 
224(a), Social Security Act — Disability Insurance Benefits — Black Lung Benefits 
— Monthly Payment Period, SOCIAL SECURITY AND ACQUIESCENCE RULINGS, 
available at http:// http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/09/SSR71-
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Professor Lubbers cited to Heckler v. Campbell, in which the 
Court upheld the agency’s use of its “medical-vocational guidelines,” 
which determined “the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the 
national economy,” so that the issue did not have to be re-determined 
in every individual adjudication and suggested more regulations to 
eliminate the need for fact finding. 
If SSA wants to manage outcomes of its decisions, it could 
determine: 
 
1. Whether claimants, rather than administrative law judges, should 
bear responsibility for developing the record.  Whereas claimants 
were once universally pro se, they now are almost universally 
represented, most by competent counsel;  
2. Whether the decisions at all levels should be made public and that 
legal opinions regarding disability should be published; 252 
3. Whether principles of vocational rehabilitation should be 
applied;253 and 
                                                 
30-di-09.html (last visited May 18, 2013); and many other case decisions.  
Likewise, in DOL workers’ compensation type cases, “[a]ll doubts are to be 
construed in favor of the employee in accordance with the remedial purposes of the 
Act.”  Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 115 (5th 
Cir. 1980).  See also Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and 
Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9 (2000).  Professor Mullins is also author 
of the Manual for Administrative Law Judges.  Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Manual for 
Administrative Law Judges, http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
252 In a recent request to the SSA Inspector General, senators complained that 
at least 100 of the 1,500 judges at Social Security are approving 90% or more of 
the cases they review.  “These numbers defy conventional logic and demand 
further scrutiny.”  Letter to Patrick J. Carroll from United States Senate’s 
Committee on Finance (May 20, 2011) (on file with author).  
 The agency is overly concerned with the Privacy Act of 1974, and could 
“sanitize” its decisions, so that Congress and the public could read judges’ 
decisions.  Sunlight may be a better disinfectant.  Professor Lubbers asks whether I 
would open the determinations at all levels.  I would.  At common law, all 
government determinations should be open.  That does not mean that the patient 
records should be open.  
253  In evaluating disability claims, SSA does not recognize that under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), including changes made by the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008)), 
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4. Whether the medical vocational guidelines are still relevant as the 
world of work has changed.  The last update of the Department of 
                                                 
require that certain accommodations to the workplace must be considered.  At my 
agency, in cases involving the Longshore and Harborworkers’ Act and extensions, 
once a claimant has a disability, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that 
there may be “suitable alternate employment.”  At SSA, the burden is on the 
government to show:  
 
If an individual cannot perform any past relevant work because 
of a severe impairment(s), but the remaining physical and mental 
capacities are consistent with meeting the physical and mental 
demands of a significant number of jobs (in one or more 
occupations) in the national economy, and the individual has the 
vocational capabilities (considering age, education, and past 
work experience) to make an adjustment to work different from 
that performed in the past, it shall be determined that the 
individual is not disabled.  However, if an individual’s physical 
and mental capacities in conjunction with his or her vocational 
capabilities (considering age, education and past work 
experience) do not permit the individual to adjust to work 
different from that performed in the past, it shall be determined 
that the individual is disabled.  
 
SSR 86-8: SSR 86-8: Titles II and XVI: The Sequential Evaluation Process, SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND ACQUIESCENCE RULINGS, available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/01/SSR86-08-di-01.html (last 
visited May 18, 2013).  Therefore, if a person had no or limited skills acquired 
from past relevant work, “disability” is directed as a matter of law.  Id. 
 Although this is the subject of another paper, I find that they cannot 
distinguish between SSA DIB claims, where the claimant is, in effect, seeking early 
retirement, because (s)he is fully and currently insured, having paid into the trust 
fund through FICA taxes, and “pure” SSI claimants, who generally have NO work 
history and have no insured status.  If SSI claimants have no work history, 
theoretically, they are automatically “disabled” under the “grids” at age forty-five if 
they have any medically determinable restriction. 
 In fiscal year 2011, 66.1% of claimants who applied at the initial stage 
were approved in Puerto Rico.  Of those rejected, 37.4% were awarded at the 
reconsideration level.  There is no indication in the statistics how many of those 
appealed.  See Statistics (NOSSCR Forum), supra note 161.  At the hearings level, 
at least one SSA ALJ in Puerto Rico had a 100% approval rate.  See also Damien 
Paletta, Puerto Rico Disability Claims Probed, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 
11, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903532804576564543481258206.
html.  However, all of these claims involve claimants who have an earnings record 
as there is no SSI in Puerto Rico. 
    
128          Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary    33-1 
 
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles was done in 1991.  It is 
reasonable to expect that the world of work has radically changed 
over the past 20 years. 
In addition, although obsessed with the administrative law judge 
reversals, the Social Security Subcommittee of Ways and Means has 
never investigated why state agencies have had such disparate results.  
It also does not consider that although Social Security is a national 
program, there may be demographic and geographic disparities.254  
Agencies pay OPM a “tax” based on the numbers of their judges 
to pay for the expense of administering the ALJ program.255  OPM 
has never accounted for the millions of dollars in receipts received 
during the time that the Azdell litigation was pending.  It certainly did 
not expend them on the administrative law judge program.  
Currently, OPM has been conducting a study to replace the 
examination currently used for candidates for the register.  It is clear 
that this is a costly effort that is most probably unnecessary, as the 
major factors for consideration should be trial experience, prior 
judicial experience, and judicial temperament.256  However, OPM has 
catered to agency demands to hire from within by watering the 
requirements.  It has not been certifying older applicants.  It has not 
been performing background checks, and although bar records can be 
easily obtained to initiate an investigation, candidates with phony 
credentials have been certified for hire.  
OPM also has not met its obligations to enforce application of the 
APA; has not promoted uniform rules of practice; has not established 
a standard ethics code, which would have eliminated duplication and 
costs for state CLE requirements now passed on to agencies; has not 
promoted professionalism; has not been interested in continuing 
                                                 
254  For example, a claimant with transferrable skills to manufacturing bench 
work may be “not disabled” in a region of the country where there may be a 
“significant” number of manufacturing bench work jobs, but be found “disabled” in 
a region where no such jobs exist. 
255  $1633 per judge per annum.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS WITH THE OFFICE OF 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SERVICES, A-05-12-
22144, Table 1 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-05-12-22144.pdf. 
256 The Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory Test (MMPI) is probably a better 
indication of temperament than any of the instruments under consideration. 
    
Spring 2013 Fundamental Fairness    129 
 
judicial education or peer review; and has been, in essence, a toady 
for SSA in maintaining the ALJ Register. 
 
X.  CASE STUDY IN THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY—SUBPOENA 
POWER257 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
[restricting the right] to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”258  Although the First Amendment does not express 
how, in furtherance of being able to seek redress, the APA Section 
556(d) provides: “A party may present its case or defense by oral or 
documentary evidence and conduct such cross-examination as may 
be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”259 
Parties should be able to prosecute or defend a case in any 
manner deemed fit.  It may be that the crucial witness cannot be 
brought to testify.  Although the APA authorizes subpoenas, some 
agencies refuse to honor that provision.260  Although there have been 
some suggestions from the ABA and even from ACUS to support 
uniformity, Congress has not acted.  For example, in 1974, ACUS 
recommended that the APA should be amended: (1) To make agency 
subpoenas available in all agency proceedings, both rulemaking and 
                                                 
257 This material has been submitted to ACUS and was used at a FALJC 
seminar in 2009.  It was compiled in conjunction with Todd Smythe, Esquire, Staff 
Attorney, Office of Administrative Law Judges, United States Department of 
Labor.  Participants from several other agencies indicated that they have similar 
difficulties. 
258 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
259 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
260 At certain non-APA agencies, due process is not observed.  Some restrict or 
eliminate the right to cross-examine.  For example, under VA regulations, no cross-
examination is allowed in BVA hearings.  However, the parties (presumably 
including the PO) may ask “follow-up questions” of the witnesses.  38 C.F.R. § 
20.700(c) (2012) (“Parties to the hearing will be permitted to ask questions, 
including follow-up questions, of all witnesses, but cross-examination will not be 
permitted.”).  Similarly, IRS collection due process (CDP) hearings do not include 
cross-examination.  26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(d)(1) A-D6 (2012) (“The taxpayer or 
the taxpayer’s representative does not have the right to subpoena and examine 
witnesses at a CDP hearing.”).  The issues in a CDP hearing would not ordinarily 
involve credibility conflicts, so cross-examination should not be necessary.  At the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), panels have the authority to restrict cross-
examination. 
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adjudication, which are subject to sections 556 and 557 of Title 5, 
United States Code, and (2) to make clear that the power to issue 
subpoenas in such proceedings shall be delegated to presiding 
officers.261  We propose the following amendments to implement this 
recommendation: 
 
1. Amend section 555(d) of Title 5, United States Code to read 
as follows: 
(d) Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be 
issued to a party on request and, when required by 
rules of procedure, on a statement or showing of 
general relevance and reasonable scope of the 
evidence sought.  Each agency shall designate by rule 
the officers, who shall include the presiding officer in 
all proceedings subject to section 556 of this title, 
authorized to sign and issue subpoenas.  On contest, 
the court shall sustain the subpoena or similar process 
or demand to the extent that it is found to be in 
accordance with law.  In a proceeding for 
enforcement, the court shall issue an order requiring 
the appearance of the witness or the production of the 
evidence or data within a reasonable time under 
penalty of punishment for contempt in case of 
contumacious failure to comply. 
 
2. Amend section 556 of title 5, United States Code to add the 
words “subpoena authority”; in the heading after the words 
“powers and duties”; to delete the words “authorized by law” 
in subparagraph (c)(2), to redesignate subsections (d) and (e) 
as (e) and (f) respectively, and to add the following 
subsection (d): 
 
(d) In any proceeding subject to the provisions of this 
section, the agency is authorized to require by 
subpoena any person to appear and testify or to appear 
                                                 
261 39 Fed. Reg. 23041 (June 26, 1974); Recommendation 74-1, Subpoena 
Power in Formal Rulemaking and Formal Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-1 
(1993). 
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and produce books, papers, documents or tangible 
things, or both, at a hearing or deposition at any 
designated place.  Subpoenas shall be issued and 
enforced in accordance with the procedures set forth 
in section 555(d) of this title.  In case of failure or 
refusal of any person to obey a subpoena, the agency, 
through the Attorney General unless otherwise 
authorized by law, may invoke the aid of the district 
court of the United States for any district in which 
such person is found or resides or transacts business in 
requiring the attendance and testimony of such person 
and the production by him of books, papers, 
documents or tangible things.  The authority granted 
by this subsection is in addition to and not in 
limitation of any other statutory authority for the 
issuance of agency subpoenas and for the judicial 
enforcement thereof.262 
 
The APA provides that “[a]gency subpoenas authorized by law 
shall be issued to a party on request and, when required by rules of 
procedure, on a statement or showing of general relevance and 
reasonable scope of the evidence sought.”263  The APA further 
provides in the section describing the powers and duties of 
administrative law judges that “[s]ubject to published rules of the 
agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may . 
. . . issue subpoenas authorized by law.”264  In 1983, the Secretary of 
Labor published Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative 
Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges.265  Section 
18.24 provides the general rule for issuance of subpoenas by the 
Chief Administrative Law Judge or the presiding administrative law 
judge.266  The provision states that the judge “may issue subpoenas as 
authorized by statute or law upon written application of a party 
                                                 
262 Id. 
263 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (2012). 
264 Id. § 556(c)(2). 
265 Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 C.F.R. § 18 (2012). 
266 29 C.F.R. § 18.24 (2012). 
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requiring attendance of witnesses and production of relevant papers, 
books, documents, or tangible things in their possession and under 
their control.”267 
At the DOL, issuance of subpoenas by administrative law judges 
is expressly authorized by the governing statute in many, if not most, 
ALJ hearings.  For example, Section 927(a) of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers Compensation Act specifically provides for issuance 
of subpoenas in respect to claims for compensation under the Act.268   
Beginning in the early 1980s and continuing through 2010, 
Congress enacted a series of employee protection (‘whistleblower”) 
laws relating to various safety and corporate financial matters.269  
Seventeen of those laws include the right to request a hearing before 
a Department of Labor (DOL) administrative law judge if a party 
contests the findings of the investigatory agency.270  None of those 
laws address whether or not an ALJ has the authority to issue 
subpoenas, and for a number of years judges were divided on the 
issue.  In Childers v. Carolina Power & Light. Co., the 
                                                 
267 Id. 
268 Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 927(a) 
(2012).  See generally Maine v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 18 BRBS 129, 132 
(1986) (en banc); Sanchez v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 5 BRBS 458, 462 (1977). 
269 See, e.g., Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures 
and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who 
Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 320–21 (1993); 77 
Fed. Reg. 71687, 72143 (Dec. 4, 2012). 
270 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 
9610 (2012); Consumer Product Safety of 2008, 15 U.S.C § 2087; Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012); 
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012); Federal Rail Safety Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 20109, as amended by P.L. No. 110-053, § 1521; Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, 
Section 402, 21 U.S.C. 399d (2012); National Transit Systems Security Act of 
2007, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1142 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 30 
U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(4) and 932(l) (2012); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 
49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2012); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9 (2012); 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012); Seaman’s Protection Act, 
46 U.S.C. § 2114 (2012); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2012); 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2012); Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2012); Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121 
(2012). 
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Administrative Review Board (ARB), which is delegated with the 
authority to act for the Secretary of Labor in review or on appeal of 
DOL whistleblower decisions, ruled that judges have inherent power 
to issue subpoenas when a statute requires a formal trial-like 
proceeding.271  The ARB reviewed statutory and decisional authority 
and found that:  
  
• “[a]dministrative subpoenas are essential tools widely used by 
agencies responsible for assuring compliance with health and 
safety legislation.”272 
• although some authority had assumed that administrative 
subpoena power is delegable only by express statutory terms, 
closer review of the “express authorization” rule reveals that 
it is not relevant to the question of whether agencies are 
authorized to issue administrative subpoenas.273   
• statutory mandates for agencies to provide formal trial-type 
hearings, for example, the ERA whistleblower provision, 
necessarily encompass subpoena authority (citing authority to 
effect that it would be incongruous to grant an agency 
authority to adjudicate and make findings of fact, without also 
providing the authority to assure the soundness of the fact 
finding).274 
• an agency given the power to adjudicate is entitled to use 
subpoenas “simply by virtue of the agency’s discretion to 
choose procedural mechanisms.”275 
The ARB noted in Immanuel v. United States Department of 
Labor276 that the Fourth Circuit ruled that an administrative law 
                                                 
271 Childers v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 98-077, 2000 WL 
1920346, at *7 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Dec. 29, 2000). 
272 Id. at *3. 
273 Id. at *4, *6. 
274 Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 795 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
275 Childers, 2000 WL 1920346, at *6–*7 
276 No. 97-1987, 1998 WL 129932, at *5 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1998). 
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judge “lack[s] subpoena authority under the whistleblower provision 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”277  “The Immanuel court 
reasoned that administrative subpoenas must be authorized by 
express terms in the enabling legislation because §§ 555(d) and 
556(c)(2) of the APA state that agencies may issue subpoenas in 
adjudications when ‘authorized by law.’”278  The ARB found that the 
Immanuel court assumed that the term “authorized by law” means 
“authorized by express statutory terms.”279  The ARB, however, held 
that “‘[a]uthorized by law’ is clearly not the same as ‘authorized by 
explicit statutory text.’”280 
On July 27, 2001, the Acting Solicitor of Labor issued a 
Memorandum to the Department’s Associate Solicitors, Regional 
Solicitors and Associate Regional Solicitors, stating that the Childers 
decision was wrongly decided, and directing that the Department’s 
attorneys “should not rely on the Board’s dictum in requesting 
subpoenas or responding to subpoenas in litigation before the 
Department’s adjudicative agencies .”281  The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia has found that an ALJ does not 
have the authority to issue subpoenas under the whistleblower 
provision of six environmental statutes.282   
The Solicitor’s memo and the Bobreski decision, however, have 
not prompted the ARB to revisit its ruling that judges have the 
authority to issue subpoenas in whistleblower cases.  In fact, in a case 
arising under the H-1B nonimmigrant alien labor certification 
regulations, the ARB expressly declined the Wage and Hour Division 
                                                 
277 Childers, 2000 WL 1920346, at *9. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. 
280 Id. at *10. 
281 Memorandum from the Acting Solicitor of Labor to U.S. Dep’t  of Labor 
Associate Solicitors, Regional Solicitors and Associate Regional Solicitors (July 
27, 2001) (on file with author).  See also PAUL GREENBERG, WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION AND THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: A ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION 8 
(2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-
annual/papers/2003/greenberg.pdf 
282 Bobreski v. U.S. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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Administrator’s request that the ARB reexamine and reject its 
decision in Childers.283  
Because DOL judges are bound by the Childers precedent, they 
will issue subpoenas upon request in whistleblower cases unless the 
case arises in the District of Columbia.284  However, the question of 
ALJ authority to issue subpoenas in the absence of express statutory 
authorization continues to be raised in whistleblower litigation before 
the DOL.285 
The subpoena issue is an example of Congressional inaction (or 
inattention) to effectuate its intent.  The DOL is not the only agency 
affected.  It is a due process issue.  It may be that, had they been 
reasonable, the agencies involved could have issued regulations to 
provide parties the right to subpoena witnesses or could create 
policies affirming the inherent right under the APA to issue 
subpoenas to effectuate the interests of justice.  If the Corps or 
Conference were in force, that body could issue rules.  Meanwhile, 
although OPM has a duty to see whether the APA is being fairly 
applied, it is apparently not interested. 
 
XI.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
After fully reviewing the relevant information, I make the 
following suggestions.  In a perfect world, the public and 
practitioners engaged in agency adjudication would be able to access 
a single, user friendly, reliable resource to find out what the law and 
regulations are, what the procedures might be, and what the nature of 
the proceeding may entail.  This resource would be accurately 
                                                 
283 Adm’r, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Integrated Informatics, 
Inc., ARB No. 08-127, 2011 WL 327977 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 31, 2011). 
284 Meanwhile, there is a “rule of necessity” that requires judges to ensure that 
statutory aims are carried out, and have inherent judicial power to make sure that 
the interests of justice are protected.  Included are rights of due process and the 
right to confront one’s accuser.  See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941) (defining rules of procedure as the judicial process for enforcing rights and 
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them). 
285 See, e.g., PAUL GREENBERG, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: A ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION 8 (2003), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/papers/2003/greenberg.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
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annotated.  ACUS would perform that service.  However, it has 
chosen not to do so.  
Rather than analyze the differences in agency procedures, many 
of which are irrational, logic dictates that it is more efficient to 
provide that all hearings fit a norm, in the name of APA simplicity 
and uniformity, rather than continue to perpetuate confusion.   
 
1. In order to promote that 
(1) agencies keep the public informed of their 
organization, procedures and rules; and 
(2) uniform standards be established for the conduct of 
formal rulemaking and adjudication, 286 
Congress should “score” to determine the relative costs of 
uniformity: 
(1) The Conference proposal of 2000, and  
(2) The proposed Corps Bill of 1992, and 
(3)  A separate scoring should include the “Type B” judiciary 
in each category. 
2. In order to ensure that adjudication under the APA is impartial 
and there are no taints of outside bias (or inside bias from the 
nature of employment within an agency that has a stake in the 
outcome of a case), Congress should immediately apply the Code 
of Conduct for United States Judges287 to administrative law 
judges. 
                                                 
286 See Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 
(1947). 
287 See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited
StatesJudges.aspx (last revised June 2, 2011). 
